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ABSTRACT 
The Islamic group the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) exists in many countries around 
the world, but each group is fundamentally different than its parent organization; why is 
this so? Like-minded organizations that are built upon common guiding principles 
superficially have little reason to change. The goal of this thesis is to understand why MB 
groups in three different countries did in fact change and become something highly 
differentiated from their progenitor group. After a thorough examination of the MB in 
Egypt, Syria and Jordan, it was discovered that the type of government that was in place, 
plus demographic factors, were highly instrumental in the formation and subsequent 
development of these groups. The level of restriction imposed by the governments on 
their populations helped to determine the militancy level of the MB group within their 
borders. The demographic makeup of the population of the country also had a profound 
and deterministic effect on the acceptable modus operandi that the MB groups could 
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A. MAJOR PROBLEM TO BE STUDIED 
Of all the changes that have occurred in the United States post-September 11, 
2001, possibly the least expected would be the affect on the vocabulary of our cultural 
lexicon. Many unfamiliar words, previously constrained to be buried deeply within the 
inner realm of academia, have crept into the conversations of the proverbial ‘man on the 
street’. Words such as ‘Sharia’ and ‘Imam’ can be heard or read almost routinely 
depending from which form of media one chooses to garner information. Another such 
term is ‘Islamist’ or ‘Islamist group’. The term ‘Islamist’ appears to have multiple 
connotations; one must pay close attention to the speaker’s context in order to derive the 
appropriate meaning. 
The late 19th and 20th century saw the rise of a powerful form of nationalism that 
planted the seeds that eventually grew into the specter of two exceedingly deadly World 
Wars. The countries of the Middle East were not to be left out in the frenzied promotion 
of political ideologies that gripped so much of the world during those years. While the 
West struggled with the competing ideologies of communism or fascism; the Middle East 
saw the rise of something called Arab Nationalism. This turned out to be a powerfully 
moving political force until the Arab’s lose in the 1967 war with Israel, along with other 
important political events in the region, after which it continually contracted to the point 
where it was no longer the inspiring force it once was. This history demonstrates that, 
along with the substantial changes in international dynamics wrought by the events of 
September 11, 2001, there is the need for an investigation into certain groups. 
Specifically studying Islamist groups has become paramount, if we are to successfully 
understand who these groups are and what they stand for. This study is necessary if for 
no other reason to discover which of these associations espouse the use of violence or not 
in the propagation of their ideas. 
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The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is such a group and holds the distinction of being 
the largest Islamist group in the world. Strictly speaking some Islamist groups, like the 
MB, are not at all new and have been influencing their countries of origin, among others, 
for decades. A few of these groups have also affected, to a greater or lesser degree, the 
international scene, though none as quickly or profoundly as al-Qaida with their attacks 
on the United States. In conjunction with the need for cultivating a deeper knowledge of 
Islamist groups and what they stand for, an in-depth investigation of what these groups, 
which are identified below, believe and what affects their behavior would be equally 
beneficial. The following thesis will attempt to address these very issues. 
The three groups that have been chosen for study are as follows: 
• The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt 
• The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and their political arm (Islamic Action 
Front (IAF)) 
• The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria 
The choice of these specific groups may look strange given that the MB in both 
Syria and Jordan have an affiliation with the first group, the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood, which is the oldest and largest Islamic group in existence.1 But this choice 
is in keeping with the aim of studying how Islamic groups adjust their behavior in regards 
to national political pressure or policies. Though the MB in Jordan and Syria did draw 
their ideological beginnings from the original MB, they are now quite different from their 
parent group which operates in Egypt. Choosing groups that superficially look similar 
acts as a controlling variable to demonstrate how the development of Islamist groups is 
molded by aspects that are country specific. 
The very fact that differences exist between the groups is part of the investigation. 
Why are these groups different and do they operate with different aims in mind? Did each 
chapter of the MB in different countries begin with similar objectives and methods in 
order to achieve similar ends as the Egyptian MB or did they break from the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood purposefully with an idea of achieving different goals? If this 
                                                 
1 Robert Leiken and Steven Brooke, “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” Foreign Affairs 86 (2007): 
107. 
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proves not to be the case, did the environment within both Jordan and Syria engender, or 
by circumstance, demand the change? Analyzing how these groups react to different 
types of governments could highlight successful or faulty policies in dealing with Islamist 
groups as a whole.  
Though the chosen groups all look to have had a similar starting point, they each 
do operate within different countries and under different types of governments. Even 
though the governments of the countries studied have similar sounding names, the 
manner by which each government operates is markedly different. Both Egypt and Syria 
are called Arab Republics, but both countries have authoritarian leaders who have broad 
powers when creating government policy. Jordan is not a republic, but rather is a 
Constitutional Monarchy. All three do share one common similarity in that each country 
is run by a dictatorial regime, but the manner in which these regimes hold onto power is 
different. 
A possible way to better highlight the difference between Egypt and Syria, given 
that they are both described as Arab Republics, is a definition given by Clement Henry 
and Robert Springborg in their book Globalization and the Politics of Development in the 
Middle East. The authors describe Syria as a ‘Bunker State’ and Egypt as a ‘Bully State’. 
A ‘Bunker State’ is described as being “...in a potential state of war with the societies 
they rule”.2 In other words, the individuals who rule within these ‘Bunker States’ are 
small groups of individuals who have tribal or religious affiliations and rule over the 
population.  The leaders have a tight control on most, if not all, aspects of life from 
directing the economy as they see fit, to controlling information flows in and out of the 
country. Because of this type of heavy handed rule the leaders have had to build a 
metaphorical ‘bunker’ to keep them safe from the populace. 
Egypt is described with a similar type of term, the ‘Bully State’. This kind of state 
is similar to the ‘Bunker State’ but, as the name implies, is not as directly repressive as 
the ‘Bunker States’. Whereas the ‘Bunker States’ are ruled by a small minority the ‘Bully 
States’ are “...at once both more narrowly and broadly based. Their rule rests almost 
                                                 
2 Clement M. Henry and Robert Springborg, Globalization and the Politics of Development in the 
Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 100. 
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exclusively on the institutional power of the military/security/party apparatus, but 
because these elites are not drawn from a clearly defined social formation, they are at 
least not unrepresentative of their relatively homogenous political communities”.3 
Though there are different terms describing Syria and Egypt one might think that they are 
fundamentally different but the difference is more a difference in degree rather than in 
kind. The political power within Egypt is surely diffused among a larger number of 
people but the state is, like the ‘Bunker States’, very controlling of its population via 
large numbers of secret police and the lax application of legal protections when it comes 
to any perceived enemy of the government. 
Unlike Egypt and Syria, Jordan is a Constitutional Monarchy whose official name 
is the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. It officially became the Kingdom of Jordan in 
1949, but prior to this date, it was never a separate and standalone entity.4 After WWI, 
the process to make Jordan an independent nation began, and with the considerable 
capacity of the nation’s two leaders, Churchill and Abdullah, and aid from the United 
Nations, the undertaking was successful. The lasting effect of the British involvement, 
which was not all always impartial,5 would remain and become a lasting political issue 
for years to come. 
In addition to examining the effect of governmental policies and attitudes on the 
modus operandi of these Islamist groups, this thesis will also look at how Islamic groups 
are affected by outside cultural influences and how the perception of these influences are 
handled or used by the groups. There seems to be, at the very least, an underlying 
importance placed on these forces based on the fact that outside cultural influences have 
been given as one of the causes for the rising of militant Islamist groups in the 1980s.6 
 
                                                 
3 Clement M. Henry and Robert Springborg, Globalization and the Politics of Development in the 
Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 134. 
4 Aqil Hyder Hasan Abidi, Jordan: A Political Study (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1965) 1. 
5 Abidi, 12. 
6 Mary-Jane Deeb, “Militant Islam and the Politics of Redemption,” The Annals of the American 
Academy 524 (1992): 54. 
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To clarify, three forces in regards to Islamist group behavior are analyzed. The 
first, governmental policies or actions toward Islamist groups within the government’s 
sphere of influence will be studied to understand to what extent these policies, and the 
corresponding political environment, have influenced how these groups operate and their 
use/disuse of violence. Secondly, cultural influences (to include national demographics) 
are studied to understand how these forces embolden or truncate operational methods 
used by the MB. And finally, a comparison of the groups themselves will be made to 
understand how, or if, they are different due to the environment that they matured in. 
These two factors will all be preceded by the history of each of these groups. This will be 
necessary to understand how the groups were created, the methods they used initially and 
whether outside cultural influences had any role in either one.  
B. IMPORTANCE OF STUDYING THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD  
The need to study Islamist groups and the approaches they use to realize their 
objectives, everything from using violence to pursuing political power via legal means, is 
ever growing. This is demonstrated by the fact that Islamist groups “are broadly gaining 
strength across the Muslim world”7 and certainly in no threat of quietly disappearing over 
the horizon. The growth and empowerment of any such group or organization within such 
an important region of the world can never be examined too much.  
The importance of such a conceivably powerful force gaining a larger hold in the 
Middle East by way of success in the political realm has tremendous implications for US 
foreign policy. As religious sentiment has grown in the Middle East over the past decades 
so has the number of religious oriented groups who have a strong influence on the 
political landscape. The consequences of serious trouble within the region will stretch 
well beyond its immediate borders and eventually most, if not all, nations would be 
affected. The affects will be felt worldwide due to the part that oil plays on the world 
stage.  
 
                                                 
7 OxResearch, Oxford: May 16, 2008 1. 
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The three groups that will be researched in this thesis are not counted among the 
more militant, violent Islamist groups. Though these groups do not now use violence, 
they each, with the exception of Jordan, have a sordid past when it comes to using 
violence to achieve their political ends. The groups within Syria and Egypt have a 
common trait in that their associations have spawned leaders of splinter groups that have 
sprung from the MB membership and these groups have relied on violence as a means of 
inciting change. The splinter groups have been responsible for the assassinations of many 
people, even heads of state. It seems that this fact alone would warrant a deeper study of 
any such groups. 
Studying these organizations from this angle may uncover or clarify insight into 
how Islamist groups respond to certain methods used by the government to contain them. 
Another important aspect is distinguishing how different types of governments deal with 
Islamist groups within their area of control. This history may also give an indication of 
which types of policies would be more successful in strongly marginalizing violent or 
militant Islamist groups, or successfully convincing these groups to back away from the 
use of violence and join in the political process. Also, the data culled from such a study 
need not apply simply to Islamist groups but could possibly be of help in managing other, 
more militant, types of entities in other parts of the world.  
Another possible outcome of such a study could open doors of understanding that 
were previously unknown. Any such understanding arrived at would likely have a 
calming effect on the approach eventually undertaken when addressing similar problems 
when dealing with likeminded groups when attempting to craft policy. Awareness of the 
likely motivations and actions of all parties involved could go a long way in ensuring that 
correct and effective steps are separated from ill-conceived, knee-jerk emotional 
responses which would bring about only a deepening of any problem. And a study of the 




C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The canon of literature dedicated to the Muslim Brotherhood is very broad. With 
the exception of the MB in Syria finding information on the MB is relatively easy to 
locate. Running through much of this literature is a debate over who the MB actually are. 
Some claim that the MB has put aside the use of violence as a means to achieve their 
ends while others yet contest that the group has simply put the use of violence 
temporarily aside and will use it again when it suits their purposes. 
The breadth of literature that will be used to formulate this thesis will be drawn 
from two main sources. First, and primarily, I use books that have been published 
describing the MB as an international organization as well as books written on each 
individual group. The need of a detailed history of each group will be essential to 
understanding how, or if, each group has changed over time. Additionally, books that 
describe some of the general history of the Middle East region, its people and its culture 
will be referenced to obtain some historical insight into why such groups even exist. 
A History of the Arab Peoples by Albert Hourani is a book that will serve many 
purposes in the writing of this thesis. Hourani begins the book before the time of the 
appearance of Muhammad, and writes of significant events all the way up to the late 
1960s. He is very precise in covering such diverse cultural subjects as the role of early 
Islam, the formation of early Islamic societies and the importance of agriculture all the 
way to the politics that led to the rise of Arab Nationalism. The book is awash in cultural 
knowledge which helps inform insight as to why certain things evolved historically as 
they did. Not only does Hourani’s writing help one understand current issues from a 
historical perspective, it can also serve to aid in indicating a possible direction for current 
movements.  
Depth of detail is one of Hourani’s fortes. He spares no effort to ensure that the 
reader understands the historical roots of a given subject. No subject is too small, if it will 




encompassing as Islam to a seemingly small subject like poetry. He describes how truly 
important poetry is in the Muslim world, not only to the people themselves, but to their 
common tongue. 
A book that will be important in studying the MB in Jordan is The Management of 
Islamic Activism by Quintan Wiktorowicz. The author has done extensive field work in 
Jordan in trying to compare two different types of Islamic groups. One group is the more 
‘formal’ of the two called Social Movement Organizations (SMO). These groups are the 
ones that the ruling regime encourages to organize that, in turn, operate under a set of 
rules that the regime creates. This, in effect, keeps these organizations within artificial 
lines dictated by the rulers so as to make sure they do not ever become too strong, and 
possibly challenge the ruling establishment. The second group studied is an informal 
group that does not, per se, organize in any specific way, but operates via informal social 
networks such as personal relationships or meetings in private homes. Wiktorowicz goes 
on to define the “manipulation of the bureaucracy to support state interests and priorities 
as the ‘management of collective action’. 
This management of collective action is the way that the ruling regime controls 
which type of groups form and which do not. The author points out the fact that the more 
overt forms of control have been put aside so a more subtle means of control needed to be 
created. This control comes through the state writing the rules that govern the creation of 
societal organizations in such a way as to only benefit the state. From the outside this 
may seem like an ineffective barrier that can be easily avoided, but when the state 
dictates all the ways in which a group can legally organize, the state’s rules must be 
followed. 
Another book that will be drawn on is a compilation of essays titled 
Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance by Marsha Posusney and 
Michele Angrist. The book is a collection of essays on subjects that range from the lack 
of democracy in the Middle East to cultural and, of course, political topics. The essays 
not only address all of the major players in the Middle East region, the most powerful 
countries, that is, but it also has more than a few that address the impact U.S. foreign 
policy in the area as regards its relationship with Israel.  
 9
It also addresses the MB in each of the three countries that are studied in this 
thesis. This book gives a good account of how dictatorial governments in the region have 
managed to stay in power while so many others are crumbling in other parts of the 
world.8 The chief source of information that will be gleaned from this book will be the 
understanding of the Islamist/government relationship from the government point of 
view. The book describes, very adeptly, the tools which dictatorial regimes use so 
efficiently to stifle opposition. As an example, one of the essays describes three specific 
historic events that had the possibility of undermining or even overthrowing the ruling 
government. The author then goes on to describe how the governments reacted to 
suppress the current, as well as any future, threat. 
The book Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World by R. Hrair 
Dekmejian draws on history to explain the creation of Islamist groups. Dekmejian breaks 
the book down into three distinct parts. The first is what are the causes or ‘catalysts’ for 
the rise in Islamic fundamentalism. He finds that the rise of religious movements has its 
roots embedded in times of crisis, and that these movements are cyclical in nature. The 
second part of the book consists of case studies of each country where these movements 
have taken place. These case studies include the countries of Egypt, Jordan and Syria. 
The third section of the book theorizes about the future of Islamism.  
Islam in Revolution characterizes the process of how Islamism began to take 
shape and gain strength if somewhat hypothetical in its conclusions. Dekmejian, 
highlights not only the historical context in which the Islamist groups built their 
foundations of thought, but also describes the mindset of the people under colonial rule 
and how these two things were integral in the creation of the Islamist groups.9 Dekmejian 
begins the book with the history of the Middle East but then moves backwards, one might 
say, to address many of the fundamentals on the subject matter. He goes so far as to 
define something as basic as Islamic group names and what they mean to the 
                                                 
8 Jason Brownlee, “Political Crisis and Restabilization: Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Tunisia” in   
Authoritarianism in the Middle East, ed. Marsha Posusney and Michele Angrist (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2005), 43. 
9 R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World (New York: Syracuse 
University Press, 1995), 18. 
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psychological and social mindset of Islamic society. Its section on Islamism and the MB 
in Syria is very helpful due to the scarcity of obtainable historical data on the MB in 
Syria.  
The fact that the MB has been virtually stopped in its tracks due to its destruction 
in the city of Hama as a viable political force within Syria since 1982, means that 
information written on the Syrian MB from that time forward is scare. Due to this 
circumstance, and the rarity of up-to-date books on the matter, this thesis will rely on 
mostly journal articles as sources. What the articles lack in historical data and describing 
central ideological themes, will be covered by the few books on the subject. Many of 
these books were written in the years just before or after the MB’s defeat at Hama.  
The Islamic Struggle in Syria by Dr. Umar F. Abd-allah is a very credible source. 
The book was written in 1981, so events that occurred in the city of Hama, which 
neutralized the MB as a potent political force within Syria, happened after the fact. To 
address this deficit Dr. Abd-allah wrote a post-script describing the entire episode as an 
addendum to the original text. The book was published in 1983, so its representation of 
the facts surrounding the happenings in Hama is untarnished by the passing of time. The 
book itself takes great care in describing Syria in all of its complexities.  
A newer book that is relied upon heavily will be The Many Faces of Political 
Islam by Mohammed Ayoob. The book tackles the sticky subject of religion and politics 
and how they bleed into one another in the Muslim world. He too starts out defining basic 
terms and ideas for the layman reader. He divides up each major player in the region and 
defines how they operate and what their stated objectives are. He also describes the 
political systems in each Muslim country as they are currently constructed, and then 
describes what facet of these types of governments that are declared as illegitimate by 
some of the Islamist, which they see are a reason to undermine them. 
Ayoob describes what he calls the “multiple voices” in the Islamic community 
and their beliefs. This description runs the gamut of Islamic groups from the militant, like 
al-Qaeda, and the non-militant like the Muslim Brotherhood. He explains that basically 
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most of these voices claim to be speaking for the entire Islamic community, but in reality 
the community is too big and too diverse for just one voice to be loud enough to speak for 
all.  
The book is thorough, not only in its recounting of the history of some of the most 
influential groups, but also in its description of where their tactics have failed or 
succeeded. The author also provides detail of how nationalist movements are affecting 
their own countries, and does a good job of making it a point to separate the transnational 
and national Islamist groups. The book proved to be utterly indispensible, not only in the 
factual data that it provides, but also in pointing out direction of where to look for further 
information on the subject. 
D. AUTHOR’S ARGUMENT ON THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD 
The attempt of this thesis is not to uncover some previously undervalued evidence 
by which to create a new paradigm for dealing with Islamist groups. It aims to dissect the 
available data in an attempt to understand who these groups are, as well as, how their 
operational behavior can be, and has been, affected. As regards the current disagreement 
within the scholarly literature as to the true nature of the MB, one side seems more 
plausible than the other. The reality that seems more likely, to this author at least, is that 
the MB is not truly adverse to using violence if they believe that its employment would 
be successful.  
The MB’s past behavior has been, if nothing else, very pragmatic in choosing 
methods that they deem likely to succeed. Their history is rife with examples of the group 
abruptly changing course and becoming involved in processes they had once deemed 
unworthy of their time. One example that springs to mind is becoming involved in 
elections. Fundamentally, with the same ease that the MB renounced violence they could 
as easily create another precept by which they could justify it reuse as a legitimate tool of 
change. Having this belief displays the need for the study that follows to expose the facts 
and understand the forces that influence any change in group behavior. 
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Undoubtedly, there are many forces that ultimately affect the means any Islamist 
group decides to employ to achieve its agenda. Likely some of the strongest influences on 
these decisions will be the pressure applied against these groups by government and, 
possibly no less so, the cultural and demographic environment that exists in the country 
of operation.   
E. METHOD AND STRUCTURE 
Data will be gathered and examined in an attempt to answer the question of how 
an Islamist group’s behavior is affected, by governmental policies and cultural stimuli, in 
the country within which that group operates. Specifically, to what degree do the political 
atmosphere and the cultural dynamics determine the actions, to include the use or 
renunciation of violence, of Islamists groups that share a common starting point? A 
detailed inquiry into these Islamist groups is necessary to summarize not only an 
historical narrative, but also to construct a transparent and understandable model by 
which one can see how these groups have changed over the years since the shift in the 
international environment with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 and what forces 
dictated these changes.  
Though there has been much written about both the rise in Islamism and many of 
the Islamist groups themselves, a problem with having enough information may still 
exist, specifically in the case of Syria. Luckily, there have been reams of information 
written about the MB outside of Syria, so the facts that surround it as a group should not 
be hard to pin down. The bulk of the problem will lie with gathering information on the 
Syrian MB. There was a good deal written about the Syrian MB during its heyday of the 
1960s and 1970s but very little has been written since the Syrian MB met their demise in 
the city of Hama after the defeat handed to them by the forces of Hafiz al-Asad. Even the 
information that was written during the 1970s will be difficult to locate given that much 




Another possible problem is attempting to connect the actions used by the 
governments against the Islamist groups to any specific response by the groups. In other 
words, how can one define, simply from the actions of an Islamist group, something as a 
reaction to specific maneuvers by a regime to isolate the group? This is, of course, in lieu 
of any specific declaration by the group(s) defining their behavior as such. One would 
think that, if after allowing Islamist groups to participate in the political process, all 
violent actions against the government ceased, then it was the allowance of participation 
that led to the cessation of violence. But that may not be the case at all for there were 
times when the MB was allowed to take part in elections, indirectly, in Egypt and 
members of the group broke off and used violence, despite the allowance of political 
participation. The difficulty lies in identifying the actual point where these groups give up 
all hope and turn to violence. The literature may, in fact, demonstrate this in something as 
specific as the group’s stating its reason for a change of tactic, or be so obvious in the 
concomitant political environment as to amount to a foregone conclusion. 
The structure of this thesis will be straightforward and linear in its presentation. 
The first chapters will detail the history of the beginnings of each of the groups studied. 
This history will run roughly from its ideological roots and their progenitors, to how the 
group was actually formed. The rather important aspect of these groups’ history with the 
ruling regimes of each country will also be elaborated on.  
After the historical facts have been established, the current rapport between the 
groups and the governments of the countries within which they operate will be discussed. 
This is a necessary step needed to be able to assess the changes, if any, in behavior of 
both the governments in regards to the Islamist groups, as well as the groups themselves. 
If any changes in behavior are to be made, then the beginnings and the current situation 
both have to be assessed. 
Next, the methods, both historical and modern, that have been used by the 
governments in dealing with these usually unwelcome entities will be investigated. This 
information will show not only what methods have had success or failure, but it will also 
provide an understanding of which type of methods are favored by which type of 
government. It can also show, depending on the methods used, what the group’s 
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responses were or are likely to be given different circumstances. Lastly, there will be a 
comparison between the studied groups to try and flesh out the environment within which 
these groups matured and its influence on the overall character of each group. 
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II. THE EGYPTIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD 
A. HISTORY 
The creation of the Muslim Brotherhood was not a social movement that simply 
sprung up overnight as some novel idea to address centuries old social problems. In fact, 
there had been similar organizations within the Muslim world for many generations that 
had traditionally organized around groups of individuals that had common ties, such as 
occupations;10 which were organized similar to the guilds of Western Europe.11 These 
organizations were called jam’iyah, or societies. Historically, the earlier jam’iyah were 
created by Christian missionaries and structured along the same lines as the European 
model. The main purpose for creating these groups was to try and promulgate Western 
ideas with the objective of growing “western cultural patterns in the Arab world”.12 
The year 1928 saw the creation of the Society of Muslim Brothers, which soon 
became known by its more common name, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB).13 The group 
was begun by a twenty-two year old man named Hasan al-Banna. Al-Banna was 
dismayed by foreign influence within Egypt, which he viewed as a disease that would 
eventually sicken and kill Egyptian society. This foreign influence, as he saw it, was 
leading Egyptians astray and away from Islamic principles.  
In response to his belief in the encroaching social decay brought about by foreign 
influence, and the Egyptian social elites that constantly abused their political advantages, 
al-Banna started the MB. Initially, the MB was an Islamic reform movement which 
targeted individuals and their personal behavior; but it soon grew into an apparatus with 
the strength to challenge the ‘secular leadership’ in the Muslim societies.14 One of the 
factors that fertilized the ground from which grew the MB, had been around since the late 
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19th century. This factor was the leaders of Egypt during the late 19th and early 20th 
century who were completely incapable, even unwilling, to end the British occupation of 
the country which had led to widespread discontent.15 
The main focus of the early MB centered on aiding the community via charitable 
programs and social work. The organization grew rapidly and quickly, gained many 
adherents during the 1930s, and had 500 branches and tens of thousands of members by 
the decade’s end.16 Much of the group’s growth and popularity was due to its social 
programs, which were successful largely because of their efficient organization. As the 
MB grew stronger, al-Banna began to press the importance of political action as a way to 
strengthen the community as a whole. Given that the Brotherhood started as a grass roots 
organization, aided those in need, and practiced what they preached, the group gained 
solid and loyal support from most sections of the population. Because of this genuine 
support by a population which was usually brushed aside by the Egyptian leaders, al-
Banna’s call for political action did not fall on deaf ears. 
Understanding that the MB was growing too strong to easily control, and fearing 
that a revolution was imminent because of the Brotherhood’s involvement in street 
violence and assassinations,17 the Egyptian government dissolved the group in 1948. This 
direct action by the government against the MB instigated a wave of violence between 
the Brotherhood and the government, which culminated in the assassination of the 
Egyptian Prime Minister, Mahmud Fahmi an-Nukrashi. A few weeks later, in retaliation 
for the death of the Prime Minister, al-Banna himself was assassinated by agents that 
were believed to be part of the Egyptian government.  
Four years later, in 1952, the fortunes of the Brotherhood changed with the 
revolution in Egypt and the setting up of General Muhammad Naguib as President. 
Naguib was given the position as President by Gamal Nasser and his Free Officer 
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movement who won the revolution with no active aid from the MB.18  During the first 
year after the revolution the relationship between the new government and the MB could 
almost be described as friendly. By 1954, Nasser was at the head of the Egyptian 
government and the MB realized that his regime was going to build a secular 
government, so they supported his political enemies. By April of 1954, Nasser had 
consolidated his power, and some months later he began suppressing the Brotherhood. 
This repression, which saw large numbers of MB members filling Egyptian jails, lasted, 
in large or small degree, until the death of Nasser in 1970.  
In that same year, Anwar Sadat became president of Egypt. Sadat soon began 
making broad changes in the political fabric of Egypt and initiated the process of “de-
Nasserization.”19 This process was designed to remake all things ‘Nasser’ which included 
ousting many of his strong political allies and allowing opposition political parties to 
form, which had been outlawed by the Nasser regime, in order to counterbalance the 
leftist Nasserist parties still operating within the country. This new political freedom 
allowed the MB to emerge back out into the open, though they had not formally been 
legalized. Sadat’s desire to move away from the Nasserist policies of the past and cut 
Egypt’s ties with the Soviet Union did not meet with approval from all segments of 
society. 
In 1972-73, university students protested these new changes and Sadat, looking 
for a way to circumvent the students, encouraged the creation of Islamic societies that 
would instinctively counter the leftist parties which were the driving force behind the 
student uprisings. His plan worked very well and soon the Islamic groups thrived and 
deeply weakened the leftist groups that were so powerful under Nasser. The success of 
the 1973 war raised Sadat’s popularity as well as helped to legitimize his use of Islamic 
themes in politics. At the same time Sadat also let many MB members out of jail and 
even allowed them to republish two of their more popular religious papers, though they 
still had not been officially legalized.  
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But again, by the late 1970s, the strained relationship between the MB and the 
Egyptian president shifted to one of confrontation. Disagreement with the many policies 
that were being proposed and implemented by Sadat saw even the Islamic groups at the 
universities, which Sadat helped to create, slowly turn against him. Because of the 
increased tension within the country and many individual’s impatience with the MB’s 
gradualist approach at obtaining full state power, militant Islamist groups began to appear 
on the scene. In an attempt to try and placate some of these Islamist groups that were 
quickly gaining members, Sadat’s government implemented Shari’a as the source of all 
legislation. Despite Sadat’s attempt to paint himself as being a legitimate Muslim ruler he 
was assassinated in October of 1981 bringing Husni Mubarak into power. 
B. IDEOLOGY 
Though it is true that the MB started out principally as an organization that 
concerned itself only with societal problems which they tackled through their charitable 
organizations, they soon became aware of the political capital they were amassing. The 
organization did not, and has not, stopped their social outreach programs, but they have 
shifted focus onto affecting politics within Egypt to a view of changing society more 
completely. Al-Banna believed that “the social and political regeneration of Egypt was 
intimately tied to the restoration of Islam as a guiding force in national life”.20 The main 
objective of the MB under al-Banna was the creation of a true Islamic state, which he 
envisioned as having “existed in the past, at the time of the Prophet Muhammad and the 
rightly guided Caliphs.”21  
With this thought in mind, this is a good place to set out the following 
foundational beliefs of the MB.  
• The creation of an Islamic state as defined by the implementation of the 
Sharia. Al-Banna believed that a state either was, or was not, a true 
Islamic nation based on this fact alone. A nation that did not follow 
Shari’a as its guiding principle in the leading of the nation could not be a 
true Islamic state. 
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• The Quran would be the constitution of the true Islamic state  
• The ruler must be bound by the teachings of Islam. Al-Banna expounded 
on this last point by creating a connection, albeit tenuous, to a democratic 
form of government under such a ruler. He depicted the ruler and the 
populace as having a “social contract” where the ruler is the “agent” that 
represents the people. Since the “agent” was contracted by the people he is 
“elected” by them.22 This, in fact, does not actually designate what 
specific type of government such a nation should have, but it does seem to 
infer the elimination some of the harsher forms of dictatorial possibilities 
where rulers push their countrymen down with their power rather than lift 
them up. 
Though the Brotherhood does believe in the creation of an Islamic state, this 
belief does not encompass the demand that the type of government that would eventually 
be set up, would be the type that existed during the time of the Prophet. Al-Banna 
believed that the Quran and the Sunna were all that was needed to form an authentic 
state, to the exclusion of all post Quran/Sunna intervening creations to include the Islamic 
jurisprudential traditions. The exclusion of Islamic jurisprudence is built in the idea that 
this tradition is not adequate to deal with modern day problems and a return to the 
original sources of Islam, the Quran and the Sunna, would be enough because these alone 
contain authority enough to address any modern day issues that may appear. This idea of 
using the Quran and the Sunna alone as the basis to lead an Islamic society is not specific 
to the MB alone, but is common to many Islamist groups.23 
After the death of Hasan al-Banna in 1948, the Brotherhood was thrown into 
disarray, hunted by the state, and quickly outlawed. The chaos that reigned had the affect 
of breaking the organization into different factions with each faction espousing very 
dissimilar views and tactics. The years leading up to the revolution of 1952 in Egypt, 
which saw the overthrowing of King Farouq, were a trying period for the MB. The 
assassination of al-Banna left a great void in the Brotherhood, leaving it without a strong 
and charismatic leader, or an ideologue to which they could address problems. The 
weakening of the MB during these years was caused, in part, by the breaking off of 
militant splinter groups from the original conservative base. This, in effect, created 
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opposing groups with one side wanting to continue with the “theory of religious 
revival,”24 and the other side wanting to respond to the political oppression that it was 
suffering under from the regime. Eventually, the role of ideologue was filled by Sayyid 
Qutb. The ideas formulated by Qutb during the 1950s and 1960s, would become 
instrumental in the Brotherhood for years to come as well as act as the main driving force 
behind many future militant groups.   
Sayyid Qutb was born in the Egyptian town of Asyut and it was said that he had 
memorized the Quran while still a child. As an adult, he was an author and a teacher and 
had received a Western education at the University of Cairo. After graduating from the 
university, Qutb spent two years in the United States studying its education system. It 
was during his time in America that his first major work of religious and social criticism 
was published. As the years passed it became widely known that Qutb had become the 
main ideologue for the Brotherhood. The attempted assassination of Nasser in 1954 saw 
many members of the MB thrown into jail, Qutb among them due to his standing in the 
movement. 
Qutb wrote a work called Ma’alim fi al-Tariq (Signposts on the Road) while in 
prison. Among other things, this piece stated that the prime function of any government 
was to enforce God’s law (Shari’a) and all Muslims under the control of that government 
were required to obey it. But the contrary was also true of any government that did not 
uphold God’s law and any Muslim under this government’s jurisdiction had a 
responsibility to disobey it. The type of government that did not uphold God’s law was 
defined as jahiliyyah, ignorant of Islam.25 This was not the only theme that Qutb 
addressed in his body of work; he also expanded on the ideas of takfir and jihad.  
The wave of nationalism that was swept the Arab world during the 1950s helped 
disseminate Qutb’s philosophical views. In fact, he recognized the power that 
Nationalism possessed and he called nationalism a creed and, in an effort to harness the 
internal power of the nationalistic feeling, identified Islam as the nationality of all 
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Muslims.26 Although Qutb names Islam as the nationality of all Muslims he disagreed 
with secular nationalism because it entailed division between peoples that created 
“bitterness and hatred.”27 At around the same period there were other seminal events that 
aided in Qutb’s ideas, gaining traction among a large segment of the population, though 
only a relative few individuals actually created or joined militant Islamist groups. Events 
such as the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, and the Arab’s defeat at the hands of the 
Israelis, all helped to exacerbate the communal feeling of “humiliation and disgrace”28 
that had been building in the Arab community since the days of colonialization.  
One of the bedrock principles that Qutb expounded on, and one which other 
principles are in turn supported by, is that of jahiliyyah. This term refers to a specific time 
period, and therefore does not carry any implication of personal culpability within itself. 
The time referred to is the history of humankind before knowledge of Allah had come to 
man by way of the Prophet Muhammad. Qutb stated that all the Arab leaders, even those 
who claimed to be faithful Muslims, were not true Muslims but had left true Islam to 
practice worldly philosophies that were based upon man-made principles. He even went 
as far as to say that what was understood as true Islam during his day, was also a product 
of jahiliyyah.29 When the essence of jahiliyyah is fully developed, then that sets the stage 
for explaining the place of jihad in the true believer’s life. Since Qutb described the entire 
Arab world as under jahiliyyah, by default the rest of the world also was suffering under 
jahiliyyah, which then called for jihad. Qutb does not believe that jihad should be strictly 
defensive, but that it must also be offensive in order to bring Islam to the infidels of the 
world. In fact Qutb defines Jihad as a command to “extend Islam to the ends of the 
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earth”.30  Much of the reasoning used by Qutb to validate some of his conclusions bears a 
striking resemblance to another western political theorist who also had great skill at 
spinning historical facts with which to create specious conclusions;-Karl Marx.  
With his interpretations of such basic beliefs, Qutb knew that he was breaking 
with much of the historical interpretation of these same ideas. So, in order for him to 
circumvent the objections he knew were to be raised about his permitting the use of 
violence against other Muslims, he tackled the concept of takfir. In effect, Qutb took the 
concept and used it as a tool by which to pursue jihad against Muslim governments. Qutb 
was taking a page out of the book of an older sect of Islam, the Kharijites. These were a 
group of people who saw only themselves as true believers and attacked anyone who did 
not agree with their beliefs.31 Qutb interpreted takfir in a similar way to use it to give 
validity to his denunciation and call to overthrow the Muslim rulers. Only through the 
defining of takfir in this way could Qutb hope to convince others to use jihad against 
Muslim rulers. As one can imagine, there were people who embraced Qutb’s writings and 
used his works as platforms of an ideology upon which they formed militant Islamist 
organizations. Two such groups were the al-Takfir group and the al-Jihad group; 
ultimately it was members from the al-Jihad group that assassinated Sadat in 1981.  
From as early as 1969, the Brotherhood began repudiating some of the more 
radical ideas of Qutb through their new leader Hasan al-Hudaybi. Hudaybi believed that 
the duty of Muslims was to preach Islam within the society they lived in, and he 
disagreed with the idea of jahiliyya stating that disobedient Muslims were simply sinners 
that could be brought back into the fold.32 This started the MB on the path of formally 
renouncing radical views that almost always led to violent action. 
The history of the Egyptian MB recounted here serves to give an idea of the 
political landscape in which the MB was initially formed. It demonstrates the influence 
that the internal cultural dynamics, such as the disparity between the classes, had on its 
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formation as well as the pressures created by the presence of the colonial powers. 
Another informative section is the history of the MB’s shift in ideology with the 
introduction of the ideas formulated by Sayyid Qutb. The atmosphere created by the 
subjugation of the MB by the Egyptian state was instrumental in the acceptance of Qutb’s 
ideas by a portion of the MB. While it is true that the entire organization did not accept 
Qutb’s ideas, nonetheless, the easily accepted change in ideology by many members 
seems to lend credence to the future possibility of the group excusing the use of violence 
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III. MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN SYRIA 
A. HISTORY 
The country of Syria is made up of a mosaic of numerous ethnicities and sectarian 
divides that have caused tension within the country, even before it was officially 
recognized as a nation-state in 1946. In fact, these ethnic and sectarian differences have 
been a tremendous source of tension for centuries.33 With the population of a country 
whose history is strewn with the rubble of confrontation along identity lines, any Islamist 
group looking for a base of support within such a populace would find the undertaking 
somewhat taxing. 
The history of the MB within the country starts before the setting of the 
boundaries which have served to create the modern day Syrian nation. During the 1930s, 
some Syrian students, upon returning home after studying in Egypt, carried into Syria 
some of the Salafist ideas that were being propagated by Hasan al-Banna.34  These ideas 
took some time to spread, but eventually the Syrian MB was created in 1945 under the 
guidance of a friend of Hasan al-Banna, a man named Dr. Mustafa as-Siba’i. Unlike the 
Egyptian MB, the Syrian MB was formed over a period of months per the direction of 
Siba’i. During this time period, Syria already had a number of Islamic jam’iyah 
(societies) which Siba’i eventually brought together under the MB banner. Among the 
groups that were incorporated in the Syrian MB, was a group called the Youth of 
Muhammad, which was started by Siba’i in 1941. 
Mustafa as-Siba’i was born in 1915 in the city of Hims to a family that was 
somewhat of a contradiction. The family produced well-known Islamic leaders that 
possessed such skills at oratory, that they led Friday prayers at local mosques, as well as 
individuals that became leaders in the Syrian Communist movement. Siba’i became 
politically active as a young teenager and, from that time on throughout the rest of his 
life, was continually in and out of prison because of this political activism. At 18, Siba’i 
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went to Cairo to further his education and met Hasan al-Banna, the two becoming fast 
friends. While in Egypt Siba’i was very active within the MB and, via this experience, 
learned the manner in which one runs a politically active, Islamic minded, group.35 
At this time both the Egyptian and Syrian MB groups were similar in some ways, 
such as organizationally, but they were each independent of the other. During the 1940s 
and 1950s, the Egyptian MB was a stronger organization partly due to its maturity, but 
after Nasser almost crushed the MB in 1954, the Syrian MB moved to the fore and 
became the principle representative for the MB in the Arab world.36  Though the Syrian 
MB could not be rightly called a copy of the Egyptian MB, they did have some basic 
things in common. Both organizations tried to affect many aspects of life, be these 
economic or social, and accordingly, they both created projects to aid their members 37 
and the society at large. 
Above all, Siba’i could be characterized as a mover, that is, one who does not 
simply talk of change but actively pursues it. Ironically enough, his most productive 
years occurred after a stint in prison where he was tortured so extensively that his health 
never fully recovered. He vehemently disagreed with the notion that Muslims should take 
a quietist and separatist approach at solving society’s problems. Though he disagreed 
deeply with the Sufi approach of separatism from society, he held Sufis in high regard 
because of their deeply held convictions. He believed that the main social objectives in 
Islam of progress, justice and the welfare of society could not be achieved without 
“consciousness, work and struggle.”38 Siba’i also stressed the absolute extreme 
importance of Muslim solidarity and emphasized the need of this reality through the 
emphasis on tawhid, the oneness of God. Essentially, Siba’i stated that the Syrian MB 
was not a political party or a jam’iyah of old but was instead a “spirit” that was to 
“permeate the Islamic community, it is a new revolution.”39 
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The year 1947 highlights a major difference between the early fortune of the 
Egyptian MB and its Syrian contemporary. In this year, the Syrian MB saw three of their 
candidates elected to the Syrian parliament although they did not run under the MB 
name. Instead these members ran under the name Rabitat al-‘ulama, (The League of 
Muslim Clerics) which was “a legitimizing body formed by several Islamic associations 
in 1946 to support the Brotherhood’s bid for seats in parliament.”40 The elections of these 
three individuals and the obvious sign of the growing strength of the Syrian MB that this 
event demonstrated looked to come to an abrupt end after the coup led by Colonel Husni 
al-Za’im in March of 1949.  
Soon after taking power, the MB approved of this coup thinking that it would 
ultimately benefit their standing in Syria, Za’im outlawed the MB, and all other political 
parties, on his way to successfully alienating most members of society including his old 
allies.41 Ultimately, Za’im’s political aspirations were short-lived as he was overthrown 
late in 1949. Soon after this new coup, legal status was returned to the Syrian MB and 
they quickly formed the Islamist Socialist Front. The Islamic Socialist Front was a 
political party created by the Syrian MB as a tool to gain wider support from a broader 
base of the population. This objective can be seen in the party’s platform. The party calls 
for social equality, land reform and worker’s rights. It also has very little mention of 
Islam or religion in general with the small exception of a need to teach people about 
God.42 This was mainly due to the presence, and strength of, other religions in the 
country.  
This type of political participation enjoyed by the Syrian MB was not so easily 
obtained by the Egyptian MB. In fact, it was not until the late 1970s that opposition 
parties were to seriously challenge twenty-four years of single party rule.43 Though 
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opposing political parties had in fact existed in Egypt before this time, they were never 
powerful and always had to ally themselves into fragile coalitions to win seats in 
government. The Egyptian MB, even at this late date, was not allowed to run for election 
as MB members, but could run as independents. The 1980s witnessed a significant 
number of MB members within opposing political parties gain significant political 
ground by winning many elected positions, which allowed these parties to propose 22 
percent of all legislation in 1984.44 The fact that the Syrian MB was involved directly 
within the political process only a few years after its formation highlights at least one 
major difference between the political environments that existed between Egypt and 
Syria at that time. 
In the early 1950s, things began to truly take a turn for the worse for the Syrian 
MB. In November 1951, the government of Hasan al-Hakim fell, and after casting around 
for a suitable replacement for the presidency, the former Minister of the Economy, 
Ma’ruf al-Dawalibi, was chosen. Dawalibi had a long history in Syrian politics and had 
held many elected positions due to the support not only of his own party, the People’s 
Party, but also because of support lent to him by the MB. The choice of Dawalibi 
appeared to put a strong ally of the MB in the highest seat of government. In the past 
Dawalibi had taken part in mass anti-west demonstrations orchestrated by the Islamic 
Socialist Front, which was a political party created by the Syrian MB. Dawalibi had also 
been supported outright by the Brotherhood for elections in his hometown of Aleppo.45 
The coup occurred on November 29 and was led by Colonel Fawzi Salu. Through 
some strong arm tactics, Salu was able to force Dawalibi to resign so as to give his 
leadership at least a veneer of legitimacy. This change of the guard eventually led to the 
outlawing of the MB in January of 1952. The new government not only outlawed the 
Brotherhood (and other political parties), but it also began the process of totally 
secularizing society. From this point on, there were a number of coups and changes of the 
head of the Syrian government. During these turbulent years of unsteady government, the 
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Syrian MB decided to back away from politics though there were still MB members 
holding elected seats that had run as independents. Instead of direct involvement in 
politics, the MB said that it would throw its support behind strong Muslim candidates and 
even went so far as to demand that any MB member who ran for parliament had to first 
resign from the Brotherhood.46 During the first few years of the 1960s, the Brotherhood 
was again allowed to legally join the political arena, which it did and won ten seats in 
parliament. But this window was soon slammed shut as the group was again declared 
illegal in 1964. 
That same year saw the new Brotherhood leader of three years, Isam al-Attar, 
exiled after the Ba’th party again took power following another coup. Al-Attar was able 
to run the MB from exile until 1969 when he was then removed from power.47  After the 
loss of the 1967 war with Israel, and the growing discontent the Arab people felt towards 
their governments because of this loss, another leader came to the forefront of the 
Islamist movement. This man’s name was Marwan Hadid. Hadid came from the ranks of 
the Syrian MB and was, like Siba’i with al-Banna, a good friend to Sayyid Qutb whom he 
met while studying in Egypt.  
While in Egypt, Hadid heard and accepted the teachings of Qutb, and upon return 
to Syria, started his own militant Islamist group. Though Hadid was once a part of the 
Syrian MB the group itself never endorsed or supported Hadid’s methods; he called for 
direct armed confrontation with the Syrian regime,48 while the Brotherhood did not. It 
took some time for Hadid to gather enough followers to create his group, the ‘Fighting 
Vanguards,49 though it never commanded large numbers of followers. It could never 
properly be called anything more than a “fringe movement on the periphery of the 
Brotherhood.”50 Like their Egyptian counterparts, the Syrian MB under Attar endorsed a 
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gradual approach to change. Hadid’s group, when it finally gathered enough members to 
carry out missions, demonstrated its militant intent in an unquestionable manner by their 
policy of targeted assassinations of important members within the regime.  
Despite early and prolonged success in politics, the Syrian branch of the MB was 
to suffer such a defeat that would, by comparison, minimize any setback that the 
Egyptian MB had ever experienced. In 1980, the Syrian MB led demonstrations in many 
major Syrian cities that were aimed at criticizing the Asad government and its policies. 
These demonstrations led to heavy handed oppression as well as the massacre of 
Brotherhood members that were held in government prisons. The MB responded to these 
government massacres by trying to assassinate President Asad who, in turn, made 
membership in the Brotherhood punishable by death. Tension grew, as well as the violent 
campaign, between the MB and the government until 1982. Finally, in February of that 
same year, a revolt broke out in the city of Hama, a MB stronghold, which the Syrian 
government suppressed by shelling the town for three weeks. The whole affair climaxed 
when the army sent units into the city culminating with the deaths of an estimated 5,000-
10,000 MB members.51 After the massacre in Hama the MB in Syria was affectively 
neutralized and the Islamic Socialist Front was forced to ally themselves with the Ba’th 
party. 
B. IDEOLOGY 
In comparison between the Syrian and Egyptian MB branches, the quantity 
written about the Egyptian MB amounts to a well constructed anthology as opposed to a 
badly edited pamphlet that holds information on the Syrian MB. This is the case for many 
reasons, not the least of which is that the MB is still a powerful political and social force 
within Egypt, while the influence that they have in Syria has been minimal since 1982. 
Given this reality, finding specifics about the ideological underpinnings of the Syrian 
branch, can be difficult to locate. 
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Both the Syrian and Egyptian MB were begun by men who knew each other and 
studied in Egypt. The man who started the Syrian MB was educated in Egypt and was a 
personal friend of one of the chief ideologues of the MB, so it stands to reason that the 
Syrian MB would be similar to its Egyptian counterpart in some basic ways; both groups 
having the same goal of trying to achieve social justice and solidarity. Where differences 
become clear, in the methods each used to achieve these goals; the constructing of these 
methods being influenced by the political environment of each country. During the 1930s 
and 40s, there were two forces that exerted a strong force on Syrian politics, the struggle 
for independence and the conflict between the new middle and lower middle classes and 
the semi feudal upper class.52 After independence was achieved in 1946, the latter of the 
two took center stage and it became very beneficial to the membership rolls of the new 
Syrian MB. The friction between these two classes also served to create a body politic to 
whom the MB message would enliven. 
The notion of auto-generated action to achieve social and economic justice was 
the main crux of Siba’i’s message. This is in keeping with his idea, stated earlier, that the 
Syrian MB movement was a revolution which in itself implies action on the part of its 
adherents. Siba’i was “fundamentally concerned with articulating Islam as a spirit that 
permeates the very being of the Islamic community”53 and that it was neither 
communism, capitalism, nor any philosophical notions created by man, but was, instead, 
a third way. The MB was the herald that called all Muslims to action and only they (the 
MB) could achieve the justice that all Muslim’s desired.  
With this in mind here follow some of the specific ideological goals that were to 
be achieved under MB leadership: 
• An end to the dependence upon foreign powers 
• An end to the dominance of the upper class 
• A limit on the amount of land an individual could own 
• Free education for all 
• Creation of a strong and independent economy 
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• All influence by outside powers in internal Syrian affairs ended  
• Endorsement of direct participatory democracy 
According to Siba’i, only a system based upon Islam could achieve aims that had 
been so eagerly awaited. One of the unstated aims of Siba’i, but one of the most crucial, 
was his desire to demonstrate how Islam could indeed tackle and solve all of the societal 
problems that Syria was facing. All of the social programs that were set up by the 
Brotherhood – clinics, schools and the like – were set up to not only resolve immediate 
problems, but; more importantly, their success was meant to be demonstrated as 
irrefutable proof of the validity of Islam to the modern world.   
Chief among the issues that are stressed by the Syrian MB is the issue of 
Palestine.54 The lion’s share of attention during Siba’i’s lifetime was spent on addressing 
this very issue. Central to the solution of the Palestinian issue was, again, the central 
concept of involved action to solve the problem and not sit back and wait for self-serving 
politicians to fix the problem. The driving force behind any such action would have to be 
a deep conviction in Islamic principles because Siba’i knew that anything less would not 
have the power to push individuals to act in defiance of resistance. 
During the years post WWII, the world was roughly divided into two camps; 
these camps were headed by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Many of the Middle Eastern 
countries would appeal to one of these two Superpowers for protection against the other. 
After many years of unwanted colonialism one can see that for this region of the world 
the idea of allowing even outside pressure to influence domestic policy was not relished, 
to say the least. During a period of such uncertainty and outside pressure, Siba’i showed 
his political acumen by devising a way to humiliate the West while keeping the Soviet 
Bear at bay. 
During the 1950s, the U.S. and Great Britain were trying to establish a system of 
allies inside the Middle East. Syria was aware of the West’s intentions and used these 
efforts as fodder to give lip-service to a possible pact with the Soviet Union. Inside Syria, 
both the MB and the Communist party were vying for support from the same 
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constituency, the urban and lower-middle classes. The MB hated communism, but they 
knew that they had to tread lightly to not alienate possible future members. During this 
period, the Arab league focused on support from Western influence in the region, so 
Siba’i propagated this perception and used it as an excuse to declare the possibility of an 
alliance with the Soviet Union, while making it clear that accepting Communism was not 
a possibility.  
Siba’i justified this conceivable alliance with the Soviet Union by implying that 
the Soviets were less guilty of creating problems in the region than the Western powers 
were. The unspoken reason for the guilt was understood by all, colonialism. The West’s 
role in the creation of Israel and the claim that the West wanted to create American 
colonies in the Middle East were also used to stir up anti-Western resentment even 
further. All of these political machinations eventually led to the West easing up on their 
efforts to build allies in the region, while the MB, through some well placed articles in 
local newspapers stating Soviet culpability in the region, was successful in making the 
proposed alliance with the USSR a non-issue.55 
At this point Siba’i came up with a solution to the superpower question; neutrality 
for Syria between the U.S. and the USSR. The MB was, in fact, the first in the Arab 
world to develop the idea of neutrality.56 The consequences following these political 
plays were three-fold and displayed the political brilliance possessed by Siba’i. First, the 
need of the Syrian government proper to treat with the Soviet Union and the West due to 
all of the anti-outsider feeling being fomented in the nation by the MB gave the 
Brotherhood more room to strengthen their political objectives. If the government was 
constantly running around putting out fires, they would have little time to meddle in 
Brotherhood affairs. Second, it kept the outside powers guessing as to which direction the 
political winds would finally end up blowing. And, finally, it created the space that Siba’i 
needed to display the Brotherhood’s social and political successes to display their 
relevance in solving both domestic and supra-domestic problems. This episode also 
demonstrates the depth of commitment that the Brotherhood had to achieving its agenda. 
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The ideals that motivate the members of the Brotherhood are painted with a broad 
brush in this section, but they suffice to give a general idea of the point of departure for 
the group’s actions. The ultimate end of the MB in Syria could well be obtained by 
achieving these separate goals. This end, broadly speaking, is to create an Islamic 
political system that puts an end to “oppression, exploitation and moral decadence; it 
must establish justice, serve the people and God’s creation, and guarantee each citizen the 
fulfillment of elemental needs: food, clothing, housing, medical care and education.”57  
The facts in this section on the MB in Syria tend to lend weight to the profound 
affect that both demographics and government policy have on Islamist behavior. 
Demographically, Syria is not a monolith like Egypt so the MB, in choosing their modus 
operandi, had to take into account the variant ethnic groups within the country. It was 
necessary that they take these facts under consideration because they could not afford to 
alienate or make enemies of too many of the non-Sunni groups. If they did succeed in 
alienating these groups then the government possibly could have had a large number of 
willing accomplices to draw to its side in its eventual fight with the MB.  
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IV. THE JORDANIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD 
A. HISTORY 
The relationship between the MB in Jordan and the Jordanian ruling monarchy 
represents a major departure from the reality described above as regards the relationship 
between the MB and the governments in Egypt and Syria. Whereas the interaction 
between the MB and the governments of Egypt and Syria can doubtlessly be defined as 
hostile, both historically and contemporarily, the situation in Jordan is the contrary. In its 
entire early history, the MB in Jordan has never tried to overthrow the ruling regime, 
used violence, or worked clandestinely. This could account for it becoming the largest 
and most powerful ‘organized social movement’ within the country.58 
The founder of the Brotherhood in Jordan was a man named Abdul Latif Abu 
Qura. In contradiction to Mustafa as-Siba’i, who started the MB chapter in Syria and was 
a personal friend of Hasan al-Banna; Abu Qura was a close and personal friend of the 
King of Jordan, Abdullah I. King Abdullah believed wholeheartedly in what the 
Brotherhood professed. He proved this belief by appointing the movement’s secretary, 
Abdul Hakim Adin, to his cabinet and was quoted as saying, “Jordan is in need of the 
Brotherhood’s efforts.”59  
Consequently, the MB was founded in November of 1945 in Jordan, and unlike 
its namesake organizations in Egypt and Syria, it did not have to work slowly and 
undercover to gain enough support in order to begin building its charitable organizations. 
They immediately began opening up branches throughout Jordan and gained quick 
support. King Abdullah approached the formation of the MB inside Jordan, and the 
possible problem it could become, from a different perspective than other leaders. Unlike 
Asad in Syria or Nasser in Egypt, Abdullah opted to embrace the MB with arms opened 
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wide. The after effect being that he created a loyal ally that fought for his regime and not 
an enemy that would be a constant threat to his rule. The fact is that the Brotherhood is 
given room to operate in Jordan as long as they are loyal to the king. 
From the beginning of their tenure, Nasser and Asad had either held the MB at 
arm’s length or actively fought them; at best they simply tolerated their presence which 
produced constant suspicion on both sides. But King Abdullah truly looked to embrace 
the Brotherhood and, as a consequence, always had the Brotherhood on his side when 
hard times came or any other group tried to challenge his power.60  But the actions on the 
part of Abdullah had a beneficial secondary effect as well.  
When Sadat came to power in Egypt, he encouraged the creation of Islamic 
groups within society with a view to marginalizing the leftist groups that were the legacy 
of Nasser. Sadat was successful in creating these groups and the marginalizing of the 
leftist groups did take place but the effort was ultimately unsuccessful as the Islamic 
groups themselves eventually turned on Sadat because of internal discontent. But where 
Sadat failed, King Abdullah succeeded. The presence of such a strong MB inside Jordan 
discouraged the creation of more radical Islamist groups.61 This reality was not simply 
due to government policies in place that hindered the creation of such groups, but it was 
also actively maintained by the MB itself fighting against the formation of other groups 
because these new groups would, if they were allowed to form, eventually draw members 
away from the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood also knew that if any other groups came 
into existence and grew to any significant size than it would be likely that the political 
environment would become more restrictive.  
Despite this mutually beneficial relationship, there have been times of friction 
between the Jordanian government and the MB; times such as the King’s support for Iraq 
in the Iran/Iraq war or Jordan’s support for the Shah of Iran just before the Iranian 
revolution. Notwithstanding the rocky times, the Brotherhood was savvy enough to not 
alienate the King, his government or, possibly more importantly, the public from which 
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they drew their support. In order to circumvent this dilemma the Brotherhood would 
attack the policies with which they disagreed, and not those who propagated them. 
Admittedly, a niggling splitting of hairs but the attacking of a nameless and faceless third 
party going by the name of ‘policy’ worked well.  
Though history proves the reciprocal relationship between the Brotherhood and 
the Jordanian regime to be accurate, each of the partners in this dance are aware that they 
must step lightly. By this is meant that each entity, the regime and the Brotherhood, 
cannot step too far out of line without causing trouble and possibly ruining the current 
rapport that exists. On the one hand the regime cannot allow the creation of an 
environment that is too easy for the Brotherhood to operate in so as to achieve great 
success in their endeavors. To allow this would be to create the impression that the MB is 
all that is needed to fix society’s ills and thereby delegitimizes the government to some 
degree. On the other hand the MB does not want to, overtly anyway, be seen as gaining 
too much power; this would likely cause the government to become more restrictive in 
how it allows the MB to operate. This would be relatively easy enough for the regime to 
accomplish given that it has crafted the art of ‘bureaucratic bullying’ for years. 
In fact this proved to be the case during the mid 1980s. This cooperative 
relationship was first strained when the Islamist opposition had gained strength because 
of the economic discontent of the population. Because of the perceived backing by the 
people of Jordan and their positions within powerful state institutions, the Islamists, the 
largest among them the Brotherhood, began to make demands of the regime.62 
Consequently, the Jordanian regime was unwilling to entertain the Islamist demands and 
began to attack them by passing laws that restricted their ability to influence society. 
Since the early 1990s, the political reality inside Jordan has changed to a large degree but 
has not degraded to an unworkable level. 
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B. IDEOLOGY 
The basic ideology that informs the actions taken by the Jordanian branch of the 
MB is in keeping with the other countries’ branches. They are committed to changing the 
Jordanian political system, but without violence. They are completely non-violent and are 
committed to using the electoral system to obtain their political goals.63 In fact, their 
current leader has renounced violence as a means to achieve their stated ends.64 The 
social work undertaken by the Brotherhood is nearly all encompassing. The Brotherhood 
runs schools, sports clubs, and youth programs while they also provide health care and 
religious lessons, to name but a few of their programs. All these activities are geared 
toward the greater goal of instilling stronger Islamic values and behavior in the 
individuals they serve. This is in keeping with their goal of changing the political system 
from the bottom up, meaning that a change in the behavior of the people will ultimately 
change the political system. The Brotherhood’s term for this is “Evolution not 
Revolution.”65 
The phrase ‘Evolution not Revolution’ contains the undeclared declaration that 
change should come first and foremost at a cultural level. The intent on the part of the 
Brotherhood to change the country wholesale relies on the idea that to change the 
political system of a country one must first change the building blocks of the society 
within which it functions. And these building blocks are cultural. The Brotherhood has 
unmasked this intention by defining their approach to change as beginning with the 
individual then moving on to the family and, finally, the government.66 The two most 
significant building blocks of any society, and the corresponding culture of that society, 
are the individual and the family. 
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Like the other branches of the MB, the Jordanian group follows what is called the 
Gradualist-Pragmatic approach. This type of approach is normally seen in the larger 
Islamist groups and the ones that have been in existence for a long period of time. As we 
have seen, the MB can easily be described by both of these terms. This method of 
instigating change is followed by those groups who understand the likely dangers, 
political and otherwise, that exist inside their realm of operation so these groups “pursue 
policies of gradualism to heighten religio-political consciousness among the masses, 
while pushing for implementation of the Shari’a by the state.”67 
In keeping with their ideology of changing the government of Jordan from the 
ground up, the Jordanian branch of the MB has formed a political wing, the Islamic 
Action Front (IAF).68 At first glance the creation of a second group apart from the 
Brotherhood seems like needless excess. Besides the law passed in 1966 banning Islamic 
NGOs from participating in politics,69 this tactic gives both the Brotherhood and the IAF 
more room to move in their perspective realms. While surely members from the MB, as 
well as like-minded non members, populate the IAF political party the actions or stances 
that are taken by the party can be directly attached to it and not the Brotherhood. The 
same applies to the Brotherhood vis-à-vis the IAF. 
This political maneuver allows the political realm to be affected by the 
Brotherhood, while providing a measure of protection to the Brotherhood proper to 
continue in their drive to continue changing the country “from below”70 via their social 
programs. In a country such as Jordan where the Brotherhood in effect is allowed to 
operate at the pleasure of the king to have an extra layer of protection is a well thought 
out strategy. As far as the beliefs of the IAF go, as one can imagine, they are in line with 
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the MB. Both the IAF and the Brotherhood have been critics, more recently than in the 
past, of the Jordanian government, but they have never called into question the legitimacy 
of the Hashemite regime.71  
The development of the IAF itself came in response to favorable circumstances in 
the political climate that were many years in the making. The 1950s saw the Brotherhood 
more or less throw the mass of its efforts behind missionary work. In the 1960s, the MB 
switched their focus to educational programs for children and the 1970s, after success on 
the education side, their efforts switched to becoming active in professional 
organizations.72 This last effort had been proven a successful tactic in Egypt as many MB 
members took on powerful positions in civil organizations, such as unions, which 
ultimately led to affecting government policy.   
The early 1990s saw a drastic change in the political winds. The process began in 
1989 when King Hussein initiated his democratization process by slowly easing away 
from political restrictions. The culminating point of this process was the passing of a 
national charter, which saw the legalization of political parties.73 After this political 
liberalization took place the Brotherhood wanted to get more directly involved in politics 
so they formed the IAF.  
Though there seemingly exists little explicit evidence of the government having 
any deep effect on the method of operation of the MB within Jordan, it actually does exist 
when one compares the Jordanian MB group with those in Egypt and Syria. The 
governments in Egypt and Syria have always disliked the existence of the MB in their 
countries (with some few instances of toleration) so the interaction between these two has 
almost always been confrontational. But the contrary is true in Jordan and the two entities 
have almost always worked together.  
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But since the Jordanian MB and the Jordanian government have always gotten 
along can one say that this is proof that the acceptance of the government has helped 
dictate the moderate methods used by the Jordanian MB?  The answer to that question 
lies in the facts recounted regarding the changes taking place between these two since the 
early 1990s. As recounted above, the government has begun taking more aggressive steps 
against the MB because of its perception that the MB is getting too strong. In response to 
these new measures undertaken by the government the MB is slowly changing its stance 
as regards the Jordanian government. This may not yet indicate solid proof of the 
assertion that government has a deep role in affecting the methods adopted by the MB but 
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V. THE CURRENT RAPPORT BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND 
MB IN COUNTRIES STUDIED 
A. EGYPT 
The history that has been elucidated up to this point in this paper serves to give an 
idea of the historical beginnings of the MB, as well as how the Brotherhood interacted 
with the governing bodies of their day. In order for any extrapolations to be made as to 
the effect of government policy on an Islamist group’s willingness to use violence, or 
other major shifts in policy, the relationship, as it exists today, between the current 
governments and each group, must be assessed. The history of the Brotherhood in Egypt 
has been a series of ups and downs with the Brotherhood being co-opted for immediate 
political gains on the one hand and then thrown by the wayside as quick as the political 
winds changed direction. That trend continues to play out today.  
During the mid-1980s, the legitimacy of the Hosni Mubarak was increasingly 
being called into question by many in Egypt so, in an attempt to strengthen the 
government’s standing, it began to loosen up on Islamists being involved in politics. The 
political space that was eventually cleared for them was mostly indirect. This 
liberalization of the political realm involved allowing the Brotherhood to stand in both 
parliamentary and local elections. This latitude did not include allowing the MB to 
become a legal political party but the government did go so far as to allow them to form 
alliances with legal parties.74 This period turned out to be rater fruitful for the 
Brotherhood as they won a significant number of elected seats in the mid to late 1980s. 
Whereas the 1980s looked to create a light at the end of the tunnel, the dawning of 
the 1990s uncovered the truth that the light was indeed an oncoming train. When the MB 
took to participate in elections in the 1980s there was a section of the Brotherhood that 
saw that involvement as a betrayal and, worse, a quasi-validation of the Mubarak regime. 
This episode also had the effect of stirring up more radical/militant groups, which started 
to cause trouble in Upper Egypt. The net effect of the trouble caused by these groups 
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actions were to culminate in a de-liberalization of the political process, reversing the 
liberalization process that took place in the early 1980s, by the Mubarak regime. Though 
many of the political parties were allowed to continue the Brotherhood faced tougher 
restrictions.75 
Though the Egyptian chapter of the MB does have a past that is tainted by the use 
of violence76 via usage of its “special apparatus,”77 the organization that exists today has 
renounced the use of violence in pursuing the implementation of their Islamist agenda. 
The beginnings of this change of heart by the Brotherhood actually seemed to have taken 
root very soon after the death of their early ideologue, Sayyid Qutb. 
Like times in the not so distant past, the mid-1950s until the mid-1960s saw 
Egyptian prisons filled with MB members. Among these members, which included 
Sayyid Qutb, there was a man named Hasan al-Hudaybi who was under house arrest for 
11 years. During these long years he was not seen as a primary leader within the 
Brotherhood but he used his time wisely as he wrote extensively on his outlook on how 
the Brotherhood could best achieve its aims. 
Al-Hudaybi began reworking, as it were, the eventual outlook of the future 
Brotherhood by writing letters to other imprisoned Brotherhood members who had deep 
concerns on the direction of the Brotherhood. These seven letters were compiled in a 
book written by al-Hudaybi and published in 1969. Al-Hudaybi did not directly 
contradict Qutb by undermining his ideas with a comparison to his own but the two could 
not have come from two very different points of views. 
Al-Hudaybi was one who believed in affecting the political system by negotiation 
and policy maneuvering. He was not at all a revolutionary but was rather a “conservative, 
with an upper-class outlook.”78 The book that al-Hudaybi wrote was called Du’at la 
Qudat, it was his primary piece of work and it outlined his beliefs and how the 
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Brotherhood could achieve them. During these lean years it provided the Brotherhood 
sustenance by “giving theological premises and explanations, giving long overdue 
guidelines to the organization.”79 It also had the effect of removing all doubt as to who 
held the leadership role for the group.  
Now, to return to the 1990s, the approach envisioned by al-Hudaybi and practiced 
by the Brotherhood for the better part of a decade since the assassination of Sadat in 
1981, (though the group officially renounced the use of violence in the 1970s), can be 
clearly seen in how the group approaches difficulties created by the Egyptian regime. At 
this point in time, the Egyptian regime began passing election laws that were designed to 
aid the government in guaranteeing that future elections saw the re-election of candidates 
that were in line with Mubarak. Instead of taking to the streets or choosing other ways of 
stirring up trouble on a broad front, the MB simply boycotted the parliamentary elections 
of 1990. For the 1995 elections, the Brotherhood decided to run, so the government 
arrested many MB members to keep them from campaigning.  
The current political setting does not seem to have changed much since the 1990s. 
Even as late as 2007, the regime arrested many of the group’s top members on a series of 
charges and had them tried by military courts. During this episode, President Mubarak 
even went as far as to name the Brotherhood as a “danger to Egyptian security because of 
their religious orientation.”80  
Since the Brotherhood has formally renounced the use of violence, one might 
look at the resistance of the MB by the regime as somewhat overbearing. Its stated goal is 
indeed to change the country into an Islamic state by a gradualist approach that looks to 
be rather benign. Politicians are many things, and chief among them are clever 
pragmatists. These same politicians know that simply because a group claims that it does 
not use violence does not mean that it is above using it in the future if its use would look 
to give a distinct and clear advantage.  
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Some possible evidence of the veracity of the claim of the conceivable use of 
violence by the Brotherhood lies at the Eastern border of Egypt, the Gaza Strip. Within 
the Gaza Strip, the Islamist group Hamas runs the government and generally manages the 
entire area. Hamas uses violence against Israel ubiquitously and they also have long 
standing ties to the MB. Like any sizable militant force they have need of food stuffs, 
weapons and ammunition and a large portion of these armaments come from inside 
Egypt.81 So if Hamas has long standing ties to the MB, then the possibility exists that 
some of this succor could be coming to Hamas with the aid, directly or indirectly, from 
the Brotherhood. At the very least, the Egyptian regime is hedging its bets by keeping the 
MB off balance inside the country, while making sure that a possible ally for the MB in 
the form of Hamas from making too many inroads into Egypt proper. 
So it seems that the relationship between the Brotherhood and the political strata 
inside Egypt, regardless of who holds the reigns of political power, has not changed 
dramatically since the creation of the group. The contemporary situation displays the 
same image that the mirror of history reflects. The political ups and downs that the 
Brotherhood has had to deal with from its inception remains alive and well, and they 
currently have to contend with another down period. 
B. JORDAN 
Unlike the unchanged antagonistic relationship between the Egyptian government 
and the Brotherhood the contemporary interplay in Jordan between these two players has 
altered significantly. The cordial, easy going nature that has characterized the interaction 
between the Jordanian Monarchy and the MB has slowly degraded. The change did not 
happen overnight as the result of one big catastrophic event but rather, like milk left out 
in the sun too long, it has slowly soured. Though the relationship has changed for the 
worse for both players it has not yet degraded to the level of the Egyptian situation. 
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The beginning of this change of interaction in Jordan can likely be placed at the 
feet of a benign and, initially, seemingly beneficial event that looked to benefit all of the 
parties involved. In the summer of 1991, King Hussein ratified a document that was 
called the ‘National Charter’. This document was written by the King’s royal committee 
and, among other things, allowed the legalization of political parties.82 The Charter 
consists of seven chapters and describes the provisions by which opposing political 
parties can form. These provisions include things such as no party can campaign to 
overthrow the monarchy and the parties cannot form militant or armed groups.83 
As one can see, the Charter looked to be a reasonable document that seemed to 
make few untenable demands. The problem turned out to be, as is usually the case in 
politics, with the application of the finished product. The King, after the ratification of 
the Charter, stated, “Every political party that comes to life in a democracy and under its 
protection must necessarily be a national party in its basic tents, objectives, methods, 
funding and affiliation. Any departure from this fact would not only be a violation of 
democracy, but an act against the nation.”84 
This last quotation sums up the basic problem with the Charter; the monarchy 
holds the power of defining what is, or is not, a legitimate political party and can 
therefore easily dismiss or disband any party that it views to be the cause of resounding 
criticism. The net effect of the Charter does not look to have achieved the stated purpose 
of creating a more democratic Jordan, but has turned out to be simply another fulcrum 
which the monarchy can use to life power out of the reach of others. 
Soon after the attempt at political liberalization via the National Charter and 
earlier attempts made in 1989, the political winds began to shift in a backward direction. 
In the run up to the first Gulf war in 1991 tensions, as one can imagine, in the entire 
region rose and Jordan did not escape these tensions. After the realization set in that the 
promised political changes were not going to ever be realized the Islamists started 
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making more demands of the government. The government response was the Political 
Parties law of 1992. This law forbad political parties from using schools and religious 
buildings from being used for political activities. Given that these areas have historically 
been the life’s blood for the expansion of MB membership it is clear who the government 
was trying to minimize.  
This first rather insubstantial attempt at de-liberalization was simply the first step 
in a longer plan. After the Oslo accords between Israel and the Palestinians King Hussein 
saw his opportunity to create a Jordan/Israel peace agreement. Knowing the this idea 
would not be acceptable to the opposition in Jordan he revised the election laws just 
before the November 1993 elections to make sure that the elections would put the 
Islamists at a great disadvantage. The King also minimized any possible interference that 
might come from the parliament by not informing them of the peace accord between 
Jordan and Israel, while it was being worked in Washington, and he subsequently signed 
it in 1994. 
Despite the political maneuvering on the part of the King, the political tensions 
grew rapidly on the revelation of the news of the peace treaty, and the worsening 
economic situation inside the country only added fuel to the raging fire. The situation 
called for desperate measures, and the political opposition, recognizing this fact, formed a 
political coalition. This coalition was truly an unexpected creation, as it was made up of 
groups that occupied complete opposite ends of the political spectrum that, during normal 
times, would be at each other’s throats. Because of the strength that is found in numbers 
this coalition ratcheted up its demand for political change. The King’s response was not 
unexpected, more repression.85 This change of the relationship between the monarchy 
and the opposition continued throughout the 1990s, and continues to this day. 
As with Egypt, Jordan looks at the power of Hamas within the Palestinian 
territories with trepidation. The fact that a violent Islamist group won, through elections, 
the leadership role of governing the Gaza Strip definitely makes the leadership of Jordan 
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take notice given the fact that the population of Jordan is over half Palestinian. Soon after 
the success of Hamas in the elections the leadership of Jordan took measures to repress 
any notions of possible success for the Islamists within Jordan’s borders. To prove their 
commitment to suppressing the opposition the government promptly arrested four top 
members of the Islamic Action Front on claims that they were “fueling national discord 
and inciting sectarianism.”86 
Though the government gave a reason for the arrests of these members of the 
IAF, the actual reason seems clear enough; the IAF represents the largest and strongest 
opposition to the Jordanian government, so successfully attacking the strongest foe first 
gives pause to those groups who are less able to respond in an effective manner. The 
actions of the government against the IAF after the success of Hamas were not based 
simply on paranoia. In fact the IAF is heavily populated with Palestinians and has close 
ties with Hamas. Azam Hunaydi, who is the leader of the IAF in the Jordanian 
parliament, was quoted as saying, in reference to the Hamas electoral victory, that the 
Islamic movement in Jordan is “mature enough to take over government 
responsibilities.”87 
Even though some years have passed since the changing of fortunes for Hamas 
the contention between the IAF and the government has not lessened. The terrorist’s 
attacks in Amman in 2005 provided a strong base, because of strong public support, for 
the government to launch more attacks on the Islamist opposition. It also does not appear 
that the IAF cares to roll back the clock to a more cordial time. The IAF leader, Zaki Bani 
Rusheid, was quoted as saying that the party was expecting to win the parliamentary 
elections in 2007 which, in turn, prompted the government to enact several measures to 
stop this being even remotely possible.88 
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This roughly sums up the situation today as it is in Jordan; the pushing and 
pulling that characterizes the power struggle since the late 1980s goes on. Though this 
struggle continues, the government still seems to have the upper hand. The Jordanian 
leaders have been very astute in dealing with the Islamist from the very beginnings of the 
modern state, and it seems to be the case that their position of strength was being slowly 
fortified from the early days of Abdullah I. Who the final winner will be, is anyone’s 
guess, but the Islamists surely have their work cut out for them. 
C. SYRIA 
The case of Syria and the Brotherhood is decidedly less convoluted than those of 
Egypt and Jordan. As recounted above, this story was mostly written and placed on the 
shelves of history in the city of Hama in 1982 when the Syrian MB was destroyed. 
Though the Brotherhood is not currently a threat to the Asad regime, there may well be a 
mode by which they could become so, if not directly, then by proxy. The way in which 
the MB could once again influence internal Syrian politics from the outside is by riding 
the wave of Islamism that is spreading throughout the Middle Eastern region.89 
At the present time, there are four major political ideologies making deep inroads 
in the Middle East. These ideologies are Pan-Arab secular nationalism, state-based 
secular nationalism, Sunni Islamism, and Shiite Islamism. Of these four, the Sunni 
Islamism strand is growing the quickest, and the MB is the largest group within this 
movement.90 Proof of strength, actual not anecdotal, is the way in which the Syrian 
regime is acting towards the Islamist movement’s growth; it is trying to recast its 
Ba’athist socialism into a genre of “political Islam”91 to preempt the change it perceives 
as inevitable. It seems that the Syrian regime has noticed the possible channel for the MB 
to affect internal politics that is afforded by the Islamist revival, and is 
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hedging its bets. This accommodating of political Islam, as dictated by the regime, is a 
way for it to dampen any challenges to its rule that might come by way of the Islamist 
movement. 
In an ironic twist, Hafiz al-Asad was fighting the Islamitization of Syrian society 
for many years prior to and after the defeat of the MB at Hama. The difficult problem 
both in Hafiz’s time, and now his son’s time, is the sectarian divide that exists between 
the Sunni majority and the various other minority communities that make up Syria.92 The 
failure of the elder Asad’s regime to successfully overcome this ever present problem 
may be the reason why his son is looking at taking the opposite approach of co-opting 
Islamism to some degree.  If the Brotherhood does try and use the current favorable 
environment to re-engage within Syria it would necessarily be by proxy, at least initially, 
because membership in the MB is still punishable by death in Syria.  
In sum, one can see that the current relationship between the MB and host 
governments within Egypt, Jordan and Syria has not improved with time. Syria currently 
has no stated problem with the MB within their borders though they are continually on 
the lookout for any signs that they may be making inroads back into the country. The 
situation in Egypt looks to be following the historical precedent though the Mubarak 
administration is indeed making life ever more difficult for the MB to gain footholds in 
the government. And, as far as Jordan goes, the historically cordial relationship between 
the government and the MB is showing more numerous signs of becoming more frayed 
around the edges. Only time will tell how this emerging dynamic will pan out. 
Now that both the historical and contemporary status, as well as the current 
rapport of the Brotherhood with their host nations has been examined, an exploration of 
government policy, past and present, towards the MB would be advantageous. The 
measures taken by the regimes to curtail the political power of the MB will be broken 
down along violent and non-violent lines. Another aspect that will be examined is the 
context in which each group was formed. In other words, the contemporary cultural 
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situation within which each group was initially formed in each country as well as major 
subsequent cultural changes that might have occurred will be examined in light of the 
group’s actions or makeup. 
The shrewdness by the regimes of Egypt, Syrian and Jordan to retain political 
power over at least the last 80 years, knows very few limits. In any game played, the 
player who knows from which play book the opponent is reading gains the upper hand on 
the opponent. This has been, and remains, the case in these three countries where the 
government represents the player with the knowledge. This analogy is supported by the 
assertion that “mass identification via religion allows political leaders to take advantage 
of people and orchestrate them.”93 This is not to say that the governments within these 
nations identify with the masses on religious grounds. What it does mean is that the 
leaders of these regimes recognize that the greatest immediate threat to their maintaining 
state power is the Islamist groups in their midst’s and know they operate along religious 
lines so, consequently, they know how to ‘orchestrate them’ because they recognize 
where these religious lines lie.  
D. GOVERNMENT POLICIES 
1. Non-Violent Means of Oppression 
One of the most broadly used measures employed to minimize the influence of 
the Brotherhood in the political arena is the manipulation of election laws. This tactic is 
what is referred to as ‘exclusionary laws’. These laws can fall within a wide range of 
areas from the appointment of politically loyal individuals into important government 
positions to the aforementioned outright changing of electoral laws. These laws create a 
“framework that provides authoritarian regimes with the right to exercise abundant 
powers” and “is thus an additional tool that allows such regimes the necessary flexibility 
to change the outward appearance of the system while ensuring its survival.”94 
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By way of example, the following is a description of the way Hosni Mubarak 
changed electoral laws prior to the 1984 elections in Egypt. Mubarak changed the past 
election law of the Winner Take All (WTA) system to one of Proportional Representation 
(PR). On the face of it this, change seemed more rational and looked to give a greater 
number of individuals more of a voice in governance. But, as they say, the devil is in the 
details. Whereas most PR systems do in fact give a wider range of people a voice in 
governing, the implementation of PR in Egypt did not have this affect due to the 8 
percent vote threshold that was needed by any one group to gain a seat in parliament. 
Though this is truly a high threshold to obtain, it would not have been insurmountable in 
some districts where the Brotherhood was strong. The eight percent threshold that was 
necessary to win was not at the local level but, instead, was at the national level. To add 
insult to injury the votes of any group that did not meet the threshold would automatically 
go to the most successful party.95 
Another example of the manipulation of the electoral laws can be taken from 
Jordan. After King Hussein undertook political liberalization measures in 1989, the 
following elections saw many of the King’s opponents win, despite his attempts at 
manipulating the election laws to favor his regime. Consequently, the King changed the 
law for the 1993 elections from the colonial plurality system that he had revived in 1989, 
to the Single Nontransferable Vote (SNTV) system. Under the old plurality system, each 
citizen had three votes, so at least one of those votes would likely be cast for a candidate 
with whom the voter agreed on an ideological basis. The regime came to understand that 
the voters would vote first for their local or tribal representative, and only after would 
they cast a vote for an ideological figure. So in order to circumvent the vote cast for the 
candidate with whom they may identify on ideological grounds, King Hussein changed to 
the SNTV system. These are just two of the countless examples of election law 
‘engineering’ that could be cited that demonstrate its omnipresence in the arsenal of 
tricks used by authoritarian rulers in these countries to guarantee their continued hold on 
power. 
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Before moving on to more obvious tactics that these three governments employ to 
enforce their will, a wider description of the genre of tactics, that the manipulating of 
election law falls into, would be informative. Quintan Wiktorowicz, in his piece 
Embedded Authoritarianism, does a good job of summing up this form of repression. 
Specifically speaking about Jordan, though his elucidation can quite easily be transferred 
onto the other two countries examined in this thesis, Wiktorowicz describes the changes 
that occurred in 1989 because of political liberalization, as nothing more than window 
dressing in that what was truly changed were simply the words used to describe a 
fundamentally unchanged political system. In an effort to describe the actual political 
reality, he coined the phrase ‘embedded authoritarianism’ with a view to stripping away 
the façade so craftily built by the government.  
In essence, embedded authoritarianism is “social control projected through a 
complex array of administrative procedures, legal codes, and informal regulative 
practices designed to constrain opposition without resorting to violence.”96 This term fits 
not only to describe the way in which election laws are manipulated, but also precisely 
encompasses the endless other non-violent means by which entrenched regimes stack the 
deck against opponents.  
2. Violent Means of Oppression 
Another widely used tactic employed by these governments to stunt the 
accumulation of power by the Brotherhood (though less so by Jordan), is physical 
repression. This genre of maneuver can take many forms from simply putting MB 
members in jail for a few days in order to keep them from campaigning to arrests that 
lead to years in prison or, more rarely, killing.  
In 1948, after the monarchy realized that the Brotherhood constituted the most 
formidable challenge to its rule, the MB was dissolved as a legal organization. The 
banning of the Brotherhood was the ultimate result of violent protests and assassinations 
of political figures in which the Brotherhood took part. This period ultimately ended with 
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the assassinations of the Egyptian Prime Minister and Hasan al-Banna. Some years later, 
after more riots in the streets to push the British out of Egypt, a coup d’état led by Gamal 
Nasser overthrew the monarchy. In the first few years of the new government the 
Brotherhood was left to its own devices, but this new found leeway did not last long. 
During a power struggle in the Nasser led Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the 
Brotherhood threw their support behind Nasser’s opponent. After the power struggle was 
resolved and the smoke cleared Nasser was the one left standing. This put the MB in a 
precarious situation, to say the least, and relations between the MB and Nasser quickly 
degraded. Things eventually came to a head with the attempted assassination of Nasser in 
October of 1954. Recognizing the opportunity afforded him by this attempt on his life 
Nasser’s blamed the Brotherhood and wholesale repression ensued. More than four 
thousand MB members were arrested of which six were executed and others imprisoned 
for life.97 
An almost identical set of circumstances as those transpiring in Egypt, was 
forming in Syria at about the same time. Adib al-Shishakli, an officer in the Syrian 
military, came to power in 1949 after his coup attempt met with success. He never 
formally took the title of president or prime minister, but chose to rule through a proxy, a 
man named Colonel Fawzi Selu; though Selu had the title of head of state and Shishakli 
that of commander-in-chief, it was solely the latter who ruled Syria until 1954. After 
many failed policies and generally complete mismanagement of the national government, 
Shishakli’s leadership began to feel resistance from all sides. To discourage any credible 
opposition, the government dissolved the Brotherhood in Syria, closing down all of its 
social work projects. These actions, in conjunction with a servile military establishment, 
solidified Shishakli’s rule.98 
Though the repression of the Brotherhood in Syria at this time was not as severe 
as that of their Egyptian brothers, it proved to be enough to ensure Shishakli’s rule for 
some time. The more severe repression of the Syrian MB did not come until the 1970s 
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when the Brotherhood tried to assassinate President Hafiz al-Asad. The years following 
the assassination attempt were full of conflict between the government and the 
Brotherhood which only came to a conclusion in Hama in 1982, as was recounted above. 
The country of Jordan, in contrast to the other two countries, has had a primarily 
non-confrontational affiliation with the Brotherhood. But since the death of King Hussein 
in 1999, and the subsequent takeover of power by his son Abdullah, this relationship has 
slowly degraded. There has been no effort on the part of the new monarch to fix the 
election laws and he even uses the emergency laws to manipulate the law as he sees fit.99 
There have been more instances of the IAF boycotting elections and generally making 
trouble for the Hashemite regime though not as of yet calling its credibility into question. 
Recently, there have been events that call into question the possibility of this historical 
relationship remaining unchanged.  
Though the Jordanian regime has not used violence against the MB, recent events 
may provide a clue as to its willingness to use whatever means it deems necessary to 
protect its position. In November 2002, the Jordanian military took over the southern 
Jordanian town of Maan. The town was harboring dozens of militant Islamists and the 
government demanded their release but the town refused. The use of the military led to 
success in arresting the militants, though at some cost in lives, but it also achieved 
another aim. It sent a message to Islamist groups inside Jordan that the government 
would have no qualms about using the military to achieve its ends if the need arose.100 In 
truth, these actions were not perpetrated directly against the MB, but it serves to prove 
that the regime is not above using violent means to subdue dissent regardless of the 
history between them. 
Up to this point, the tactics used by the governments of Egypt, Jordan and Syria 
against the MB in order to minimize their impact on their prospective societies have all 
been rather direct in their approach. Without doubt, some such as the manipulation of the 
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law to favor the regime, have a veneer of legitimacy, but this guise remains intact only 
until the moment the most superficial investigation is undertaken. Though at times the 
direct approach can be the best solution to a problem, politics is rarely so straightforward, 
and the leaders of these nations know this truth well. This, in turn, leads to the last tactic 
that will be discussed employed by the leaders, a tactic that, on its face, does not portray 
itself as such. This tactic is the act of co-optation. 
Co-optation is meant to mean the action by the governments themselves of not 
ostracizing or clashing with the MB, but instead making them feel a part of the political 
process. In truth, this looks simply like a rational, fair minded approach to dealing with a 
powerful opponent; hence its power. At one time or another, all of these countries have 
had a leader in power that has used this stratagem. In Egypt, the toleration of the 
Brotherhood has been an on and off affair even up to today. The Brotherhood was given 
broad latitude to operate in the first years of the revolution101 up until Nasser outlawed 
the group in 1954. Even in Syria, there was a small window in the mid-1950s when they 
were granted legal status by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.102 The story in Jordan has 
been one of total cooptation by the monarchy there since its inception and only recently 
has serious trouble between the government and the Brotherhood began to strain this 
interaction. 
At first glance, cooptation may not seem like a method of repression. But if within 
the definition of repression there exists the intention of regulating the accumulation of 
power by a likely political rival what better way to restrict this growth than by 
determining when, where and how much power is obtained? The very closeness of the 
MB to the regime via cooptation, allows the regime to control outside influences that 
could benefit the Brotherhood while, at the same time, having one less blatant enemy to 
have to deal with.  
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The measures employed by the governments of these nations to weaken the 
attempts of the MB to attain power, add credibility to the assertion that the MB tailors its 
operational methods to governmental action against the group. Where there has been 
violence against the MB, as in Egypt and Syria, there has been a response in kind from 
the MB. Also, where there has been non-violent action taken by the government, as in the 
cooptation scheme in Jordan, there has been no violence from the MB. Another example 
of non-violence comes from Syria. In the early years of MB influence in Syria, before the 
rise of Hafez al-Asad, the MB worked within the political realm and only became truly 
violent when the state used it against them.  
 59
VI. COMPARISON OF GROUPS 
A. EGYPT 
The preceding chapters have described the histories of three MB groups from 
their very beginnings to include their ideological underpinnings. The groups in Syria and 
Jordan were created by men who learned many of the skills needed to create and run their 
perspective groups either through time spent in the MB in Egypt, or from direct contact 
with the movement’s original founders or ideologues. This last chapter will outline the 
trajectory of each group from the days of its inception up to the time of the destruction of 
the Brotherhood in Syria in 1982. The core purpose of this chapter is to examine 
significant events that occurred in these countries during this timeframe, to understand 
cultural/political events, and to measure any repercussions that they would have had on 
the Brotherhood. This comparison will take into account not only political forces specific 
to each country, but will also examine any social or demographic stresses that could have 
had an impact on the groups.  
The external forces that feed into the collective pulse of a nation can be similar in 
kind between nations, but are usually very different in degree. Colonialism, for example, 
has left its legacy on most Middle Eastern nations, though some nations have had better 
success at overcoming the various negative consequences left by it than others. During 
the years of, and prior to, the initial creation of the Brotherhood in Egypt the population 
had two great desires, to remove their shared burden embodied in the corrupt king and 
drive out the British.103 This unconscious like-minded agreement that pervaded the 
majority of the population helped to aid in the acceptance of the ideas spread by Hasan 
al-Banna and the creation of the MB.  
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Not only did the pulse of the times aid in recruitment for the Brotherhood, it also 
aided in allowing Nasser to obtain political power. Both Nasser and the Brotherhood rode 
the wave of popularity that followed the success of the revolution until Nasser began 
suppressing the Islamist group in 1953-4. The success of the revolution eventually 
satisfied the public appetite to be rid of the King and the British influence, but was to 
create new social dynamics that would roil and foment and would eventually play into the 
hands of the Brotherhood. The abundant social changes that took place under the 
direction of Nasser were the driving force behind these new social dynamics. 
After Nasser took power, he quickly began sweeping social changes. He 
implemented land reform, which limited land holdings to no more than 200 acres per 
person.104 This was only the very beginning of changes that would ultimately result in the 
National Charter of 1962. The charter gave the government the right to nationalize any 
private company it chose to but it also had very personal effects on the population. It 
recognized the citizen’s rights “to social welfare such as education, health care, 
employment, minimum wage and social insurance for the elderly.”105 The National 
Charter and the land reform each had provided a great influence on the social makeup of 
Egypt partly by growing the middle class and reducing the power of the feudal landlords 
who had held a position of prestige for many years. 
During the pre-Nasser years, the monarchy followed a liberal model of economic 
development while Nasser, after he had taken over the reins of government, followed a 
socialist model of economic development. Each of Nasser’s programs had limited success 
but they ultimately failed in solving the majority of Egypt’s economic woes.106 Though 
Nasser’s attempt at socialism did not have the wide ranging affect that he hoped it would 
have it did create some positive outcomes, such as elevating the numbers of individuals 
that would receive an education. This fact in itself cannot be considered as a negative but 
its secondary effects were, and remain, very detrimental. One such harmful effect is 
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centered in the subsequent failure of Nasser’s program to invigorate the Egyptian 
economy, the lack of the creation of enough jobs. It is without doubt that educating a 
greater proportion of any population is a laudatory achievement but there must also be 
corresponding success in job creation for the newly educated to be gainfully employed or 
trouble could soon follow.  
The phenomenon of having more educated people than jobs, where the newly 
educated could exercise their talents, points us to inquire into the membership of the 
Brotherhood. The initial makeup of the Brotherhood‘s membership when it was a 
fledgling organization is mostly unknown,107 but subsequent studies have shed light on 
the matter. Initially anecdotal evidence pointed to the membership being populated by 
individuals that possessed only a rudimentary education. But further study has revealed 
that the reality was actually the opposite, most of the members were urban professionals 
from the middle class.108  
The use of the term ‘urban’ here can be misleading, because it can lead one to 
believe that the members were always city dwellers, but that is not the case. The 
members were urban in the sense that they, in fact, did live in the cities but the majority 
of them had come from rural settings where they had grown up and had only recently 
transferred to the city. The relevance being that, though the members were highly 
educated, they had grown up and matured in a very conservative environment which is 
likely what drew them to the Brotherhood. So an indirect consequence, and undoubtedly 
completely unintentional, of the failure of Nasser’s socialist policies to energize the 
Egyptian economy coupled with his policy of educating a broader range of Egyptians, led 
to more individuals strengthening one of his strongest political rivals, the MB, via either 
increased membership or increased sympathizers.  
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Nasser then began aggressively subduing the Brotherhood in 1954, and even 
executed six and put over 1,000 more on trial after the attempt on his life.109 The 
humbling that the MB endured at the hands of Nasser had far reaching affects that seeped 
into almost every portion of the group. A large number of the top leaders of the 
Brotherhood were jailed for many years. These years turned out to be a very dark period 
for the MB not only for the depravity of prison life but also because of the questioning of 
the validity of some of the precepts from which the MB operated. This began a time of 
“vibrant internal struggles during the period of imprisonment.”110 The internal struggle 
that transpired during the prison years had the effect, salutary to some yet disgusting to 
others, of moderating their stance towards radical premises.111 
Though the bulk of the MB was imprisoned, the group itself continued to function 
though at a less effective level and another round of repression hampered it even more, 
this time to an even greater degree. The 1967 war with Israel did tremendous damage to 
the Nasser regime and disillusioned the majority of the population with the failure of 
Nasser’s Arab Nationalism. Even with this defeat, Nasser was able to hold on to power, 
but he did begin to back away from some of his more repressive programs and, 
responding to public outcry, began allowing some liberalization of the economy. These 
changes even bode well for the Brotherhood. As Nasser searched for even more 
legitimacy via Islam, he began to release MB members from prison, and by 1971, only 
about 140 remained incarcerated.112 
After the death of Gamal Nasser in 1970, Anwar Sadat became president. In his 
search for legitimacy Sadat began empowering Islamist groups to fight the leftist 
influence left over from the Nasser years. This strategy by Sadat went a long way in 
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“promoting Islamist militancy”113 and, consequently, the MB. Though this did have a 
positive effect on the Brotherhood the circumstances that developed after the victory in 
the 1973 war would ultimately be more far reaching. 
After Egypt’s victory in 1973, Sadat attempted to ride his wave of popularity by 
instituting many new policies. One of these new policies was called al-infitah, or opening 
to the west. This policy was aimed at drawing in foreign capital, mainly from the west, to 
create and strengthen the Egyptian private sector.114 This policy did in fact work in 
making some Egyptians very wealthy but too many people felt no positive change from 
the policy. Rising inflation helped to increase unrest with the infitah policies and the 
conspicuous spending habits of the recently wealthy capitalists which were offspring of 
the same infitah did much to undermine Sadat.115 
The examples given by no means accounts for every event that affected the 
actions and ideology of the Egyptian MB but they do serve to relay an idea of some of the 
major happenings that determined the direction of their policy and their resiliency. At this 
point we will look at the events and political environment that helped to shape the Syrian 
branch of the MB. 
B. SYRIA 
The case of Syria and the facts on the ground differ significantly from that of 
Egypt, despite each having a long history with dictatorial regimes. At first glance, Syria 
does not look like an area of the world that outside powers would or should have a deep 
interest in, given its lack of any appreciable amount of natural resources. But, in actuality, 
outside powers have been acutely interested in Syria because it occupies a crossroads and 
“whoever would lead the Middle East, must control her.”116 
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Social dynamics in Syria were also much different than in Egypt. Egypt is a 
nation made up of predominantly Sunni Muslims with small minorities of other groups 
such as Coptic Christians. Despite its numerical superiority the Arab population within 
Syria is “riven with sectarian cleavages.”117 The Sunni Muslim population within Syria 
does constitute the largest group in the nation but there are significant minorities of 
Alawis, Greek Orthodox Christians and Syrian Christians. There are also smaller 
numbers of minorities made up of Syrian Catholics, Maronites and Armenian Orthodox. 
This cultural dynamic alone does have an effect on how boldly the MB could move when 
trying to influence change. Though these diverse groups assuredly at times work at cross 
purposes to the MB there was one constant that affected all of them, with the exception of 
the Alawis, from the mid 1960s and that was the “...murderous regime of Hafiz Asad.”118 
The Brotherhood in Syria also had a major constituency difference in that they 
were a predominantly urban organization, and did not have much luck penetrating into 
the countryside, like their Egyptian counterparts, or into the military establishment, likely 
due to the tight control of the military by Asad.119 The practical outcome of this reality is 
that the bulk of the Brotherhoods work and influence was limited to Damascus and 
Aleppo which constitute two-thirds of the urban population in Syria.120  
Like other nations in the region during the first half of the 20th century, the people 
of Syria were compelled by gaining independence and domestic troubles that were 
increasingly the product of struggles between the middle and lower classes.121 Though 
the independence issue stretched beyond the reach of the Brotherhood it aided generously 
to the political strengthening of both classes especially during the time period in which 
they were most politically active prior to the coup of Za’im in 1949122 and up to their 
suppression by Shishakli in 1952. 
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Hafiz Asad did not obtain full governing power over Syria until 1970 but the 
years between 1952 and 1970 are instructive in the development of the MB’s in Syria. 
Beginning around 1952 the repression of the Brotherhood became more of a rule rather 
than an exception. Soon after this reality set in with the leadership of the MB the group 
gradually started to back away from political involvement of any type. Despite this retreat 
from politics the Brotherhood was repressed even more aggressively after the union, 
called the United Arab Republic, between Egypt and Syria from 1958-1961.123  
The disorganization of the MB, caused by the repression, was deepened when in 
1963 the leader of the MB in Syria was exiled when the Ba’ath party came to power. In 
1969, an even greater problem for the Brotherhood appeared in the form of a leadership 
crisis. Their leader in exile, Isam Al-Attar, was stripped of his leadership role due to 
disagreement from other top members because of some of his policies.124 The 
Brotherhood was harried almost continuously and kept on the defensive until the defeat 
of Syria at the hands of Israel in 1967, which put an end to the popularity of Arab 
nationalism. At this time some members of the Syrian MB started to find their feet after 
years of oppression but the leadership crisis of 1969-70 led to a split in the Syrian MB 
that was not resolved until just before their defeat at Hama. This time period also allowed 
Marwan Hadid to begin his machinations that started his violent crusade against the Asad 
regime and ended with his group’s defeat at the hands of the same regime.  
The ‘years in the wilderness’ (1952 – 1970) that one may define during which the 
MB suffered were very detrimental to the group’s expansion. Their continued harassment 
by the state was a major factor that retarded their development but was not, by far, the 
only barrier they had to surmount. There was the persistent problem of having to take 
direction from a leadership that was constrained to act from afar coupled with an ever 
changing government establishment. From 1949 until 1970 when Hafiz Asad came to 
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power there was a total of twenty coup or coup attempts.125 Given this fact, any direction 
that did come from the Brotherhood leadership in exile would be useful only for a short 
period of time because the enemy, the government, was always changing. 
The reality that a clear majority of the Syrian population is Sunni Muslim, could 
cause one to foster the idea that support for the MB cause would not be difficult to obtain. 
At some level, this is true, but not to the degree that one might expect by just looking at 
the numbers. Asad also recognized this natural advantage that fell to the Brotherhood so 
he moved quickly to devise a social policy to undermine it. The success of this policy 
was instrumental in keeping the support for the Brotherhood, until the rapid rise of 
Islamism in Syria in the late 1970s, within a manageable range. 
The social policy of the Asad regime was focused on both the minorities and the 
Sunni majority in Syria. Among the enticements Asad used to obtain the loyalty of these 
groups, were things such as land reform in the countryside and economic incentives that 
would target supplying aid to the “ex-peasant” elements of the population.126 These 
reforms worked just well enough and garnered just enough support from diverse groups 
to allow him to not rely exclusively on an Alawi base. Asad also was aware of the MB’s 
influence in the urban centers that housed the large Sunni population, so he focused the 
efforts of the social policy on garnering support from rural Sunnis who had no affinity for 
the brand of Islam that the MB was preaching. In conjunction with his co-opting support 
from rural Sunnis, and with a view to enhancing this support in absolute terms, Asad used 
heavily coercive tactics against the urban Sunnis when necessary in order to make them 
think twice before supporting the Brotherhood. 
The sectarian divides inside Syria remains a difficult problem. In addition to the 
government’s tactics to attenuate the MB in every sense, the historical problem of the 
many sectarian divides had a deep impact on the ability of the MB in Syria to gain large 
amounts of power easily. Any efforts that the Brotherhood could have conceived of to 
undermine the regime’s power would have to necessarily take into account the effects 
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that these endeavors would have on other minority groups and to what extent. Other 
smaller and less powerful groups may seem only a nuisance to any larger group but if too 
many small groups are aggrieved by the action of the MB than they could possibly find 
themselves facing one newly formed, upset mass rather than a few disparate groups. 
The fifteen years or so of little to no leadership and the rough, continual 
suppression by the many different governments during the same time period also did not 
provide the opportunity for any appreciable gathering of strength for the Brotherhood. 
The environment of continually changing and ineffective governance within a given 
country can provide space for groups such as the MB to grow without much external 
interference but during these same years the Syrian MB had to overcome leadership 
issues as well as divisions within their own ranks.  
The diverse challenges to the Syrian MB, with the exception of their few years of 
political activity early on, had a considerable effect on the make-up of the group. It was 
not simply the political oppression during the bulk of their existence that affected it but 
also the myriad cultural matters that are so much a part of the Syrian history. If many of 
these sectarian issues did not exist it could have been feasible during the many years of 
political unrest, and before the rise of Asad, the population could have turned to the 
Brotherhood and their strength would have increased. 
C. JORDAN 
The history recounted earlier demonstrates the case of the MB within Jordan is 
unlike its experience inside Egypt and Syria. Because of the fundamentally different 
historical experience that the MB traversed in Jordan, recounting the factors that affected 
their development are less blatantly ‘in your face’ and so are somewhat more difficult to 
surmise. Though the history of the Brotherhood in Jordan is filled with decidedly fewer 
bracing circumstances, of great importance, that highlight their molding, the conditions 
that it did live through are no less informative for understanding how Islamist groups 
react to their immediate surroundings. 
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The most consistent molding force since the creation of the MB in Jordan, is the 
fact that the country has had a steady line of stable successors, unlike Egypt and Jordan. 
Jordan has had only three different heads of state since the assassination of King 
Abdullah I in 1951, and all of these have been from the same family. This is not to say 
that there have not been challenges to the rulers but, all in all, the trouble has been minor 
and quickly contained. The faction of the Brotherhood that grew in Jordan never had to 
suffer under a Head of State that one day pretended friendship and the next threw them 
into prison, like in Egypt, or a national leader that simply hunted them wherever they 
were to be found, such as in Syria.  
As stated earlier, the MB had enjoyed relative freedom of movement from their 
very beginnings when they were accepted and legitimized by King Abdullah I. Each 
subsequent Head of State has followed the lead of the first King and, despite some rocky 
times in the past, only recently has even some hint of real trouble between the Monarchy 
and the MB begun to appear. The current King has begun resorting back to the old trick 
of manipulating the election laws to try and minimize the rise of fundamentalist Islamist 
groups inside the country.  
It may appear that because of the cooperation between the MB and the Jordanian 
government, there is little by way of instruction to draw from this background; however, 
this is not the case. The historical amiability between these two entities has had both good 
and bad consequences for the MB. On the good side, the Brotherhood has had deep 
access to the state government for many years via state employment. The Brotherhood 
exists in all levels of government to include Ministry positions.127 The Brotherhood has 
also enjoyed the special distinction of being the only Islamic NGO that has the open 
support of the Jordanian government. On the negative side of things, the very essence of 
who the MB is or should be, has been, and continues to be, questioned by other Islamist 
groups outside of Jordan.128 The simple fact that the MB has worked for such a long time 
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arm and arm, as it were, with the rulers of Jordan tends to make outside groups believe 
that the Jordanian MB has fallen victim to a Middle Eastern version of the Stockholm 
Syndrome. 
The demographics and cultural influence on the MB of Jordan is a tougher knot to 
unravel. While the demographic makeup of Egypt, and Syria has had a noted and even an 
extensive effect on the Brotherhood and how it operates the demographic, effect is less 
clear in Jordan. It is clear that there are a very large number of Palestinians within Jordan, 
but the government has purposefully kept the numbers from the most recent census 
strictly secret.129 There is no doubt that the numbers of the non-Jordanian Palestinians in 
Jordan is rising, but no one knows for certain to what absolute level. This may seem of 
little consequence but ever since the HAMAS electoral victory in Gaza in 2006 the 
Jordanian regime is continually concerned about the non-East Bank (non-native 
Jordanians) Palestinian population. This also aids in straining the relationship between 
the MB and the Jordanian government due to the fact that HAMAS is a faction of the 
Egyptian MB. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The history recounted above describes facts that occurred in the formative years 
of the MB in the three countries studied. Undoubtedly, these facts serve to build a 
somewhat coherent picture of the history of these groups, but possessing this information, 
when compared in the light of the experience of the MB groups in other countries, can 
help build insight into how to deal with other groups of a similar stripe. The history that 
was conveyed, concentrated on three main forces and their subsequent effects, that aided 
in shaping the groups studied: the political and the demographic environment within each 
country and the general environment created by these two forces that the group mature 
within. 
The political environment that the Brotherhood was constrained to work within, 
without question, had a tremendous effect on how the organization could act. Of the three 
MB groups studied, the Syrian branch ceases to exist. The history of the group within 
Syria bears this out to be a not unsurprising reality. The group’s early history in the 
country gave them little chance to plant deep and healthy roots, due to its fragmented 
leadership and the ever changing political environment. When a stable government 
finally did take shape, it was extremely brutal in its repression of the Brotherhood and 
was willing to employ any measure, no matter how violent, to subdue them. 
Similar political pressures were applied to the Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan, 
but with decidedly different outcomes. In Egypt the Brotherhood remains one of the 
strongest opposition groups in the country but the repressive and political measures of 
past regimes, as well as past failures by the Brotherhood, have caused them to back away 
from using violence in their ever present battle against the current state. The case of 
Jordan is instructive in its opposite effect. The political environment in Jordan has always 
been willing to accommodate the MB and give it room to operate. The consequence 
being that the two entities have almost always worked together. Only within the last 
decade or so is this relationship showing signs of changing for the worse. 
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These facts seem to indicate that the political/cultural environment under which 
the MB groups operate heavily influence the actions that the groups are willing to engage 
in. The more violent the political environment, as demonstrated by the case of Syria, the 
more aggressive the actions undertaken by the Brotherhood. In contrast, and possible 
support for the assertion made of the Egyptian case, Jordan’s permissive political 
environment has served to keep the MB in line as evidenced by the fact that the group has 
never used violence against the Hashemite regime and remains a political force in the 
country.  
The demographics specific to each country have also had an effect on the 
Brotherhood even if, in lieu of well researched empirical data, the conclusions presented 
here are somewhat anecdotal. The support of the population is tremendously important 
for any anti-state organization operating within a nation’s borders if it is to have any hope 
of success. Support from the population becomes even more important in direct 
proportion to the suppressive measures employed by the country’s government. Again, 
Syria is a prime example. 
When Hafiz Asad came to power in 1970, his repression of the Brotherhood was 
heavy handed almost without pause. Consequently, the support from the population that 
was needed by the MB was difficult to obtain given the deep sectarian divides not only in 
the country as a whole but also because of the divides that existed in the Sunni majority. 
Regardless of the support that the MB began to build because of the rising wave of 
Islamism in the early 1980s, it proved to be not enough to avoid their destruction by the 
regime. 
Without doubt, the MB in Egypt has suffered under heavy repressive measures 
throughout the years, but has not been destroyed. Part of the explanation as to why this is 
the case may well be due to strong support from the 90% Sunni majority. Egypt does 
have some minority communities, but is not beset by the same severity of sectarian 
divides like that of Syria. Also, if there are restraints put on the measures that the MB can 




same restraint applies to the government. That is, it is a restraint if the government does 
not wish to become, or be seen as, a totalitarian regime which, incidentally, Syria was 
and is. 
The history of each of these nations demonstrates some very large differences 
between the countries. These differences include demographic variables, different 
colonial histories by different colonial powers and different types of governments to 
name but a few. Despite these differences the MB still sprung up and grew within the 
boundaries of these nations. The fact is that the populations of each of these nations, at a 
cultural level, were not being provided with what was needed. This void felt by the 
people goes beyond their simple physical needs, which the MB has been instrumental in 
providing where the governments were failing, and points to something deeper. The 
governments of each of these nations used cultural differences to separate and divide, 
whereas the MB offered an alternative where all could huddle under one umbrella, the 
Umma. This will surely not appeal to everyone, but if compared to the alternative, and the 
last fifty plus years has proven the realities of that alternative, it may not seem that bad to 
many. 
To conclude, it seems that both the political and the demographic environment 
has a significant affect on the MB groups that operate within Egypt, Syria and Jordan. 
The degree to which each area affects the groups more profoundly is dependent on many 
factors, but likely this effect is not static and ebbs and flows with the prevailing political 
and cultural winds. 
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